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Abstract 
 
 
Teachers have historically been paid using a single 
salary schedule. However, since the publication of A Nation 
at Risk (1983), calls for implementing reforms have led to 
alternative pay for teachers becoming increasingly common 
among districts across the nation. Such implementations 
have seldom been accompanied by input from teachers about 
how such methods affect their profession. Since teacher’s 
voice seems to remain almost absent in research about these 
implementations, with a few exceptions noted in the 
literature review, their input about how such methods of 
alternative compensation impact their work as educators 
emerge as a necessity. Research-based knowledge must fill 
this need. 
The purpose of the study was to measure teachers’ 
perceptions about how an alternative method of compensation 
has affected their teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration. The study sought to describe patterns of 
relationships between the perceptions of teachers about the 
impact on teaching practice, motivation, and collaboration 
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of the incentive pay plan implemented under the Districts 
Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) and an array of 
independent variables related to the exercise of their 
profession in their campus. These variables include money 
awarded by the program, subject and grade taught, and 
teacher characteristics (experience, certification, 
demographic data, etc.). 
A survey research design was used in the study. The 
instrument was administered to teachers in elementary and 
middle schools campuses in the Fort Bend Independent School 
District, in the metro area of Houston, Texas, where 
alternative compensation funded by the District Awards for 
Teacher Excellence (DATE) was implemented. Data collection 
occurred during May 2010, and the online survey was 
accessed by 241 teachers. One potential participant did not 
accept to take part in the study and 22 participants did 
not answer any instrument’s item, thus leaving the total 
number of actual respondents to 219. 
Factorization techniques were used to confirm the 
validity and reliability of the instrument. Data analysis 
was conducted using simultaneous multiple linear regression 
statistical techniques. 
The results of the study showed that the scales 
developed to measure the perceived impact of compensation 
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on teaching practice, motivation, and collaboration are 
adequate scientific measurement tools. The results also 
indicated that the findings concluded from the scales 
developed should be analyzed with caution. The regression 
models processed to find the degree of association between 
predictor variables and the perceived effect of alternative 
compensation did not show statistical significance in two 
of the three perception scales measured: teaching practice 
and collaboration. The regression model processed to find 
the degree of association between predictor variables and 
the perceived effect of alternative compensation on 
motivation showed overall statistical significance. Two 
independent variables in the model showed a statistically 
significant degree of relationship with the dependable 
variable: one positive (Asian teachers compare to White 
teachers) and one negative (Age). Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the DATE incentive program did 
not affect in any significant way teachers’ teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration in the exercise of 
their profession, as perceived by the teachers themselves. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examined teachers’ perceptions about how 
the implementation of a performance-based alternative 
method of compensation in the Fort Bend Independent School 
District (FBISD) affected elementary and middle school 
teachers’ teaching practice, motivation, and collaboration. 
Teaching practice as a construct is broadly considered for 
this study to encompass the complexities of the 
multilayered process in which teachers and students engage 
in the context where teaching and learning occur. Teaching 
practice then, is not equivalent to the actual delivery of 
instruction that occurs generally inside a classroom. 
Within this framework, discussed in the literature review 
section, the study focused on the teachers’ perceived 
effects of the incentive pay program on their teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration. 
  
Need for the Study 
 
Even though teachers have historically been paid using 
a single salary schedule, a document used by school 
districts to pay teachers based exclusively on credentials 
and years of teaching experience, other methods of 
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compensation have been implemented during the 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s. These alternative methods, called incentive 
programs or performance-based programs, which received a 
push by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), are 
becoming more popular in school districts around the nation 
within a context of outcomes-based education. With the 
announcement of President Obama’s Race to the Top (as part 
of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009), 
and its allocation of 4.35 billion dollars to states on a 
competitive basis to implement educational reform 
initiatives, such as pay for performance, it is foreseeable 
that there will be an increase of implementation of these 
methodologies in school districts around the country
1
. In 
Texas, the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) is 
a state funded program which incentivizes performance pay 
plans for teachers with allocation of funds totaling $247 
million for the school year 2008-2009 and $197 million for 
the school year 2009-2010, exclusively for the development 
of performance pay plans under the umbrella of DATE 
(Springer, M. G, Lewis, J. L., Podgursky, M. J., Ehlert, M. 
W., Taylor, L. L., Lopez, O. S. et al., 2009). For the 
                     
 
1 Contingent to the appropriation of funds sanctioned by Congress in the 
federal budget. 
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school years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011, the total allocation 
of funds reached $520,842,117 (TEA, 2011a).  
One of the tenets of enacting these new methods is to 
pursue improvement in teaching quality and, thus, increase 
student achievement as measured by test scores. Teachers’ 
input should be integral part of a successful 
implementation of such policies since their involvement is 
directly tied to their willingness and propensity to change 
(Seashore, Febey, & Schroeder, 2005). However, few studies 
have been published about the teachers’ perceptions on how 
such new methods of compensation have impacted the exercise 
of their profession.  This study researched teachers’ 
perceptions of the impact that an incentive compensation 
program implemented under the umbrella of DATE had on their 
teaching practice, motivation, and collaboration. In doing 
this, the study is bringing to the forefront teachers’ 
voice about how they perceive the extent to which these 
methods affect their trade. 
Figure 1 shows synoptically the logic followed by the 
study. 
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Independent Variables        Dependent Variables 
 
 
 Money awarded by performance 
based program in the current year 
 Money awarded by performance 
based program in the previous year 
 Age 
 Ethnicity 
 Grade / Subject taught 
 Type of Teaching Certification 
 Path to Teaching Certification 
 Teaching Experience 
 Experience at Current Campus 
 
 
       Classroom Teacher 
 
Figure 1 
Classroom Teacher’s Perception about how the Independent 
Variables affect Motivation, Collaboration, and Teaching 
Practice 
  
The development of such scientific knowledge may 
inform policy makers in the future implementation of 
methods of compensating teachers as well as help teachers 
discern more precisely how a specific contextual variable 
may affect the practice of their profession. 
 
 
 
T
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n
 
Teaching Practice 
Motivation 
Collaboration 
Scales created from 
participants’ 
responses 
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Statement of the Problem 
 
Teachers represent a funnel in the educational system. 
They are those in direct contact with learners and almost 
all applications of educational policy aimed at educating 
children are directly or indirectly channeled through 
teachers. Because teachers’ perceptions affect teaching 
practice, investigating any policy component that may 
affect how teachers exercise their profession from a 
perspective of teachers’ perceptions becomes relevant. 
Since alternative methods of compensation are one 
policy component application advocated by the current 
school reform movement, understanding how such alternative 
compensation programs affect teaching practice is a current 
research problem as reflected by an emerging body of 
scientific literature in this topic. 
These programs’ implementations aim at improving 
student outcomes. The theory of action behind these 
programs is that they would motivate educators to change 
their practice to improve student achievement. The theory 
of action also hypothesizes that earning money will enhance 
collaboration and increase morale, leading to better 
student achievement. In addition to the motivational effect 
they may have, rewarding differentiated awards would also 
provide incentives for change (Marsh et al., 2011). These 
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programs then seek to boost teachers’ motivation, enhance 
professional collaboration, and promote change of practices 
to improve student achievement. 
More information is needed about the extent of the 
impact that these performance-based incentive programs have 
on motivation, collaboration, and teaching practice as 
perceived by the teachers themselves. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of the study was to describe teachers’ 
perceptions about the impact of a method of alternative 
compensation implemented in a large urban school district 
on their motivation, collaboration, and teaching practice. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The purpose of the study was to address the following 
research questions: 
1) “Do the hypothesized conceptual dimensions (teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration) correspond 
with the dimensions (factors) derived from the data 
collected with the original survey administered for 
the study?” 
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2) “To what extent do each of a series of variables (the 
amount of money awarded to teachers by the program, 
years of teaching experience, years of teaching at 
current campus, age, ethnicity, type of teaching 
certification, path for teacher certification, and 
school level/subject taught) relate to the perceived 
effects of alternative compensation on teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration, if at all?” 
 
Definition of Terms 
 
Teaching Practice. The Teaching Practice construct was 
broadly considered for the purpose of the study; this 
construct encompasses the complexities of a multilayered 
process in which the teaching-learning process occurs in a 
school setting. Teaching practice includes the delivery of 
instruction typical of a classroom practice but exceeds it. 
For example, it embodies: decisions to work together with 
other teachers; feeling responsible to help others teachers 
do their best;  helping anywhere, anytime, even though is 
not part of the teacher official assignment; analyzing 
students’ work to find curriculum standards still to be 
met; following an instructional calendar or pacing plan; 
aligning lessons to a specific standard; having students 
help other students to learn standards; focusing 
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instruction to standardized tests; administering 
benchmarks; reviewing students’ test results with other 
teachers; seeking help informally from other teachers; 
decisions to allocate time spend by students in assignments 
in school and at home; providing opportunities to students 
to spend more or less time in inquiry based learning; etc. 
(Items measuring Teaching Practice in the TEEG Cycle 2 
Teacher survey Spring 2008, Springer et al., 2009). In 
another study, items measuring this construct also include: 
increasing instructional time by lengthening the day, the 
year, or shortening recess; providing before or after 
school instruction or programs; organizing inquiry teams of 
teachers and administrators to address the needs of 
students; providing additional instruction to low-achieving 
students; increasing the use of student’s achievement data 
to inform instruction; teaching test-taking strategies; 
etc. (Survey items measuring teaching practice in Marsh et 
al., 2011). 
Motivation. Based on Bandura’s expectancy theory, 
“teacher motivation to perform is a function of the 
perceived probability that working hard will lead to high 
student achievement, the perceived probability that high 
student achievement will lead to certain outcomes 
(including a performance bonus) occurring, and the 
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desirability of each of these outcomes to the teacher” 
(Heneman III, 1998, p. 44). 
Collaboration. Collaboration occurs when participants 
engage in meaningful activities working together with peers 
to co-construct knowledge about teaching and learning 
(Musanti & Pence, 2010). 
Single Salary Schedule. Single Salary Schedule is a 
document used by school districts to pay teachers based 
exclusively on credentials and years of teaching 
experience. 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The purpose of the study was to describe teachers’ 
perceptions of the impact that one alternative method of 
compensating teachers implemented in Fort Bend Independent 
School District had on their teaching practice. This 
chapter first addresses alternative pay for teachers 
followed by a description of the District Awards for 
Teacher Excellence (DATE) grant, under which Fort Bend ISD 
implemented its alternative compensation program. Then the 
literature on teaching practice and how teachers’ 
perceptions affect teaching practice is reviewed followed 
by the literature on teachers’ perceptions and compensation 
to establish the theoretical link between alternative 
methods of compensation and teachers’ perceptions effect on 
teaching practice. 
 
Alternative Pay for Teachers 
 
Although nearly 100% of public school teachers are 
paid using salary schedules (Podgursky & Springer, 2007), 
single schedule pay for teachers appears to be problematic 
for some because it encourages accommodation of the 
mediocre teacher in the classroom (Jupp, 2005). By not 
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promoting differentiation between those teachers who 
produce high student performance and those who do not, it 
would, on one hand, diminish the attractiveness of the 
teaching profession in the labor market, and on the other, 
push out of the profession those who perceive their skills 
as being better rewarded in other professions (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007; Podgurky, 2009). Consequently hiring and 
retaining good teachers is hindered by the single schedule 
pay for teachers (Jupp, 2005; Podgurky, 2009). 
This notion has been especially debated as part of the 
frenzy surrounding the publication of A Nation at Risk 
(1983). During the 1990s, a shift in federal administration 
and education policy put reliance on outcomes as measures 
of organizational effectiveness in education (Kelley, 
Conley, & Kimball, 2000; Heneman, 1998). The No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB) galvanized this shift. Thus as part of 
the so-called “comprehensive” reform proposals in 
education, alternative ways of paying teachers, also called 
merit pay, have been implemented with increased zeal, and 
have most recently been to some extent analyzed and 
evaluated. 
Advocacy for new ways of providing incentives to 
improve teachers’ performance, as a measurement of quality 
of teaching, has taken the form of alternative incentive 
12 
 
 
 
pay programs that incorporate extra monetary rewards for 
teachers based on their students’ performances. NCLB has 
been a stimulus to experimenting with performance-based 
salary schedules (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
The variety of alternative methods of teachers’ 
compensation being experimented with across the United 
States is corresponded by a wide range of perspectives on 
alternative ways of paying teachers in the academic 
community. These perspectives can be grouped in two schools 
of thought; their essential differences come down to 
whether or not performance pay programs for teachers are a 
viable system to implement in education. 
On one hand, there are proponents of these systems, 
usually referred to as merit pay systems, in which either a 
numerical formulaic statistical approach or an economicist 
approach is considered. The alternative method of 
compensating teachers becomes the visible aspect of the 
assumption that schools must follow the formal rationality 
advocated by American businesses (Cuban, 1983; Giroux, 
1983; Goodman, 1979; Shannon, 1982 cited by Shannon, 1986). 
One of the beliefs of these models pledges that merit pay 
systems are good descriptors of teachers’ effects on 
students. It is assumed that merit pay systems have 
positive academic consequences in the school. Authors in 
13 
 
 
 
this approach assert that districts can explicitly state 
their expectations of teachers’ performances, and from 
there, teachers who fit in to the district expectations 
will more likely remain as school teachers while those who 
don’t will leave teaching for other professions that better 
suit their demands from a professional job (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2007; Koppich, 2005).  Further, these authors 
predict that merit pay systems are more likely to occur in 
environments where there is more performance information 
available, implicitly encouraging a quantitative approach 
to measuring the results of educating children (Goldhaber, 
D., DeArmond, M., Player, D., & Choi, H., 2008). Children, 
as demonstrated by student outcomes, would benefit from 
this type of pay system by the improvement of the quality 
of instruction they receive from teachers whose salaries 
have been linked to compensation and career advancement 
more closely (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2007; Lavy, 2007). But the 
supporters of such types of incentive pay for teachers have 
extended beyond economists and statisticians, to include 
political leaders, opinion makers and teachers (Jupp, 2005; 
Koppich, 2005). 
While the proponents of these systems announce the 
positive effects of merit pay on teacher retention and the 
quality of education as shown by better student 
14 
 
 
 
achievement, some studies contradict such conclusions. As 
cited by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) studies found 
that teacher mobility is related to characteristics of the 
students, particularly race and students’ achievement, 
while salary exerts a modest impact in turn over. 
Furthermore, other authors bluntly declare that merit pay 
is not well-suited for education, finding explanations in 
the inherited nature of the educational process. They seem 
to focus more on the complexity of the process of educating 
children, since “education involves multiple stakeholders, 
disparate and conflicting goals, complex and multitask 
jobs, team production, uncertain inputs, and idiosyncratic 
elements contingent to the attributes of individual 
students, efforts and attitudes of fellow teachers, and 
classroom environments” (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002, 
p. 914). 
In a very short and poignant article, Donlevy (2008) 
made the case for merit pay in education analogous to the 
financial institutions’ incentive pay systems’ role in the 
credit meltdown of 2008 that affected the entire planet. 
The author affirms that this system is part of the 
capitalist culture and that, as a result, “there is a 
tremendous incentive for meeting or exceeding targets at 
any cost” (p. 246). The argument is based on the 
15 
 
 
 
assumption, neglected by the economicist and statistical 
approaches for merit pay, that the aims of education are 
incompatible with systems that promote putting aside from 
education essential components of educating children. Some 
main components of educating children, such as political 
and democratic values, values of beauty, harmony, 
aesthetics, and solidarity, attitudes towards the 
environment and the well-being of others, or values toward 
to what purposes knowledge is developed and used, are not 
quantifiable through performance tests. 
Grinesky (2005a, 2005b) in a back-and-forth 
controversy via peer reviewed publications with the 
Teaching Commission of New York
2
 critiques the underlying 
assumptions and assertions about schooling, teacher 
education, and qualifications supported by incentive pay 
plans for teachers based on student achievement. The author 
maintains that it distorts the purpose of public schooling 
and does not consider powerful effects of contextual 
variables on achievement and all aspects of life, like 
poverty
3
. 
                     
 
2 The Teacher Commission of New York is represented by Grenman, J. 
3 A good example based on extensive research about how poverty affects 
language development, IQ tests performance and achievement in 
standardized tests can be found in Hart, B., & Risley, T. (1995). 
Meaningful differences in the everyday experience of young American 
children. Baltimore: Paul H. Brooks. Berliner (2005) further argues 
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Districts Awards for Teacher Excellence 
 
The Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), the 
Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG), and the 
District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) are three 
distinct state-funded grant programs designed to support 
performance pay proposals for teachers in Texas, which 
became one program under the umbrella of DATE when the 
program began.  GEEG was funded with state and federal 
funds and completed its operations in August 2009 when the 
TEEG program last cycle ended and the DATE program became 
implemented. Together, they were the largest statewide 
performance pay for teachers in the United States K-12 
school system (Springer et al., 2009). 
Since the creation of DATE in 2006, Texas has spent 
nearly $550 million to allow districts to design their own 
strategic compensation programs. For the 2010-2011 school 
year, over 300 districts implemented the program. The 
districts represent over half of Texas' student and teacher 
populations (District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) 
Technical Assistance Center, 2011). 
Beginning in the 2008-9 school year, all school 
districts in the state of Texas were eligible to 
                                                             
 
that poverty places several limits on what can be accomplished through 
school reform efforts. 
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participate in the DATE program for at least two years. 
Schools qualified to participate in these programs based on 
two criteria. First, they had to be in the top third of 
Texas public schools in terms of percentage of students 
economically disadvantaged, stratified by school levels 
(elementary, middle, and high school).  Second, schools 
were also qualified by the Texas Education Agency (TEA) as 
high performing (schools that attained Exemplary or 
Recognized status) or high improving (as determined by 
value-added calculation measures). Schools who met the 
economically disadvantage students percentage criterion and 
were qualified by TEA as either high performing or high 
improving, qualify for DATE grant funds (Springer et al., 
2009). Districts which wanted to participate had to commit 
to match 15% of the funds and they would spend a minimum of 
60% of the money in performance pay for classroom teachers 
(Part I funds) based on measures of student achievement and 
the amount of bonus must be equal or greater than $3,000 
(Springer et al., 2009). The rest of the funds (Part II 
funds) could be spent among other expenditures (such as 
professional development, mentoring, instructional 
materials, etc.) including paying teachers extra 
compensation. The districts participating in the DATE grant 
18 
 
 
 
locally developed their own performance pay plan following 
the aforementioned broad guidelines. 
Fort Bend ISD was one of the local Houston area school 
districts which implemented its performance-based 
compensation program under the umbrella of DATE. The 
project purpose was to reward teachers for positively 
impacting student achievement with focus on most-in-need 
campuses to improving quality of teaching, and improve 
instruction (FBISD, 2011a). One of the guiding principles 
of the implementation is that teacher collaboration is a 
critical component of school improvement, suggesting 
collaboration among teachers should not be obstructed by 
the implementation of the program. 
The FBISD performance-based compensation program was 
implemented in 23 elementary and middle school campuses 
(FBSID, 2011a), whose TEA report cards show a total of 
17,269 students and 973 teachers (TEA, 2011b). 
Even though there were no explicitly stated reasons 
why these campuses were elected for the grant, the 
District’s Program Goals were 2: Increasing the percentage 
of students meeting state standards, and Increasing 
achievement by all students as measured by TAKS scale 
scores (FBSID, 2011a). 
19 
 
 
 
Four Guiding Principles were established for the 
implementation of the program: 
1) The classroom teacher is the school employee who most 
impacts student achievement. 
2) Students vary in their preparation and inclination 
towards learning when they enter a teacher’s 
classroom, so awards should be based on improvement 
whenever possible. 
3) Teacher collaboration is a critical component of 
school improvement. Alignment of curriculum and 
instructional strategies within and between grade 
levels and subjects is essential for raising the 
achievement of all students. 
4) All staff impact student achievement even if their 
impact is not directly measured by TAKS or other tests 
(FBSID, 2011a). 
The final evaluation report on the DATE program for 
the state of Texas as a whole indicated that there was no 
difference in student achievement between DATE schools and 
schools across the state that did not participate in DATE 
(Springer et al., 2010). In addition, teachers indicated 
that DATE had no effect in improving schools. The study 
found that the more years schools were under the DATE 
program, the more competitive the environment became. 
20 
 
 
 
Further, teachers were less likely to report changes in 
teaching practice, and they indicated motivation remain the 
same, except on those campuses where the performance pay 
was based on the individual teacher performance (Springer 
et al., 2010). 
 
Variety of Alternative Pay for Teachers’ Systems 
 
Many of the systems utilized to calculate extra 
compensation for teachers are rooted in methodologies that 
reflect teachers’ performances based on student 
achievement, as expressed by results in standardized tests. 
But these are not the only systems implemented in the 
United States since pay for performance plans come in many 
different formats. The array of alternative methods of 
compensating teachers includes systems that can reward 
individual teachers based on students’ achievement; reward 
groups or schools for attaining certain standards of 
achievement; rewards based on classroom observations or the 
development of annual portfolios and conferences between 
teacher and supervisor; alternative methods of compensating 
teachers can also include bonuses for assistance, or the 
21 
 
 
 
combination of any of the forms mentioned above, among 
others
4
. 
Regardless of the criteria used to calculate bonuses 
for teachers, a theory of action supporting the alternative 
compensation programs emerges. These programs are 
implemented to promote change in practice, boost 
motivation, and enhance collaboration (Marsh et al., 2011). 
Three methodologies of determining extra pay for 
teachers are further discussed to summarize the main 
findings in relation to change in teaching practice, and 
the effects of the incentive programs on motivation and 
collaboration as perceived by teachers. 
When it comes to current implemented performance based 
incentive pay for teachers, one of the systems that seems 
to be gaining controversial popularity across the United 
States (see Sanders, 2004) is based on value-added 
measurements of students’ outcomes.  Value added analysis 
is a statistical methodology in which the developers affirm 
teachers’ effects on student achievement are measured by 
statistically controlling other effects on students’ 
                     
 
4 Examples of alternative teacher compensation plans are: ProComp 
(Denver, CO), E-Comp (State wide Florida), Q-Comp (Minnesota), ASPIRE 
(Houston Independent School District), Cooperative Performance 
Incentive (CPI) Plans (Raham, 2000), a ladder system developed by non-
profit organization Teacher Advancement Program, or the Vaughn Next 
Century Learning Center (Los Angeles Unified School District). 
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performances. One of such systems, EVAAS
5
, is used to 
evaluate, identify, and judge campuses and teachers 
performances based on students’ growth in comparison to 
gain averages within groups of campuses and groups of 
students. Thus teacher effectiveness is measured using the 
students’ “value-added” achievement scores derived from 
EVAAS. A recent study called for the stop of using this 
methodology as basis for high stake decision in teachers’ 
accountability due to the lack of reliability as an 
indicator of how effective a teacher is in the classroom 
(Baker et al., 2010). 
However, incentive pay systems are not restricted to 
merit founded incentive pay systems based on statistical 
measurements, such as value added approaches. Other systems 
are in place where teacher evaluation and performance pay 
are based on standards. The degree to which these standards 
are met are assessed in interviews between a teacher and an 
evaluator, conferences, feedback and professional 
development. These assessments are the basis for incentive 
pay. Extensive research has been conducted in some of these 
systems such as the one implemented in the Vaughn Next 
                     
 
5 Education Value Added Assessment System (EVAAS) is a proprietary 
method created by Dr. William L. Sanders to calculate student 
achievement gains in comparison to mean gains within homogeneous groups 
of students. 
23 
 
 
 
Century Learning Center in Los Angeles, California (Kellor, 
2005; Gallagher, 2004). 
The main finding about motivation is that teachers 
“would work just as hard to achieve the school-wide outcome 
goals even without the possibility of getting a bonus” 
(Kellor, 2005, p. 12). This finding suggests that extra pay 
based on performance does not affect the motivation to 
increase efforts to achieve school outcomes. Conversely, 
when it comes to how the alternative pay affected teaching 
practice, teachers declared that after the third year of 
implementation “they made real changes to their teaching 
practice to receive the additional pay” (Kellor, 2005, p. 
15). Thus it seems that extra pay did have effects on 
teaching practice by accommodating their teaching to 
increase outcomes that will lead to receive the extra 
compensation. In regards to collaboration the perception of 
teachers was “that it reduced the sense of community among 
teachers” (Kellor, 2005, p. 16), suggesting a negative 
effect on collaboration was produced by the implementation 
of the alternative pay program. 
Another type of pay program implemented in the United 
States is Cooperative Performance Incentive (CPI). CPI 
programs award funds to teachers and other school staff 
based on achievement of school-wide educational objectives 
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(Raham, 2000). The author avers that “the premise of CPI 
plans is that when an entire school community works 
together to raise student performance over its own previous 
benchmarks, there are more positive results than with plans 
that merely reward individual efforts” (Raham, 2000, p. 
143). On the contrary, systems based on the performance on 
individuals to disburse funds to teachers “may have a 
demoralizing effect on the workplace, corroding teacher 
collegiality by introducing competition” (Goldhaber et al., 
2008, p. 263). Pudgursky and Springer (2006) describe the 
negative effects of merit pay on collaboration as they 
portrait some of the critiques to performance pay by what 
it has become known as “the nature of teaching hypothesis”. 
The authors synthesize the supporters of this notion 
reporting that “introducing performance-related rewards at 
the individual teacher level might reduce incentives for 
teachers to cooperate” (p. 18). 
Raham (2000) notes that in Texas and North Carolina, 
where CPI plans have been implemented, schools appear to be 
changing their teaching practice in a way that increases 
student achievement. However, this conclusion is referred 
to as based on anecdotal evidence suggesting more data 
should be gathered and analyzed to arrive at any conclusive 
substantiation. A more recent study about grants from the 
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Texas governor’s office to allocate funds to schools based 
on students’ performance data concluded that 75% of 
teachers perceived the money allocated by the grant did not 
affect their teaching practices (Springer et al., 2009). 
In addition, Raham (2000) summarizes studies on CPI 
implementation in several US states, in some particular 
school districts, and in other nations (Britain, 
Switzerland, and Canada) concluding that teachers increased 
their commitment to achieving school wide goals, thus 
considering the monies awarded had a positive effect on 
teacher motivation. However this is not a definitive 
conclusion, since in Kentucky and North Carolina teachers 
varied in how much the possibility of earning extra money 
motivated them to improve student achievement. Similarly, 
the three year grant to schools from the Texas governor’s 
office study showed a negligibly increase in agreement 
among teachers that the bonus was not large enough to spur 
motivation. Same results were shown in a study conducted in 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District where the author 
concluded that funds awarded to teachers were viewed as 
appropriate and an appreciated form of recognition, but of 
too small an amount; conversely helping students learn and 
seeing them meet achievement goals were reported to be more 
potent motivators than the bonus per se (Heneman III, 
26 
 
 
 
1998). Therefore the few studies about the impact of extra 
pay by alternative methods of compensation on motivation as 
perceived by teachers are inconclusive. 
CPI programs implementation seem to have the support 
of teachers. Springer et al. (2009) reported that “the 
greatest support was expressed for rewarding teachers based 
on performance measured at the school-wide level” (p. 40). 
This suggests that programs with no competition component 
at individual level have the support of teachers. Raham 
(2000) noted that schools that achieved their goals were 
characterized by “meaningful collaboration among teachers” 
(p. 155). Collaboration, as the co-construction of 
knowledge and skills necessary for the exercise of the 
teaching profession, has received much of the attention of 
recent research (Gilles, Wilson, & Elias, 2010; Killian, & 
Wilkins, 2009; Levine, 2010; Musanti, & Pence, 2010) and 
extensive professional development has been aimed at 
developing such a capacity (see Bradburn, 2007; Cozza, 
2010; Sang, 2009).  
After three years of GEEG’s implementation there was 
“an increase over time in the percent of respondents 
reporting that teachers seem more competitive (27% to 36%), 
and an increase in the percent reporting a lack of trust 
among the teachers (20% to 26%)” (Springer et al., 2009, 
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p.64). Johnson (1999) suggests that the answer to 
accountability, when it comes to teaching within the 
current school reform environment, is found in 
collaboration. He suggests that there is a need to 
establish an emotional bond through trust to make sure 
success and learning has occurred for all participants in 
the learning process. Bradburn (2007) reinforces this idea 
stating that collaboration is an essential component to the 
success of educational reform through sustained 
collaborative planning. 
Yet, in spite of its importance, research about how 
the implementation of alternative methods of compensation 
affect collaboration necessary to co-construct knowledge 
and skills that will lead to increases in teacher quality 
and student’s learning remains insufficient, and its 
findings inconclusive. 
 
Teaching Practice 
 
Notwithstanding the numerous studies conducted 
regarding teaching practice, the principal investigator was 
not able to find a definition of the construct teaching 
practice. Close to an encompassing definition of the 
construct, Wong and Mac Whinney (2009) relate the concept 
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of teaching practice as the way a subject is taught. 
Emphasis is put on how a subject matter is delivered. 
Similarly, Chikunda (2008) explains a model of attachment 
teaching practice as a philosophical base and its delivery, 
focusing though in the delivery aspects of teaching. 
So even though teaching practice appears as a 
dependent variable in innumerous studies, the concept is 
simply taken for granted. In studies about alternative 
methods of compensation, teaching practice is considered as 
any aspect of the teaching-learning process related 
directly or indirectly to the delivery of the subject 
taught and the learning environment. As shown by the items 
surveyed by the TEEG Cycle 2 Teacher survey of Spring, 2008 
(Springer at al., 2008), the variety of events considered 
to assess teaching practice is wide in scope. These items 
include among others: decisions to work together with other 
teachers; to feel responsible to help others teachers do 
their best; to help anywhere, anytime, even though is not 
part of the teacher official assignment; analyzing 
students’ work to find curriculum standards still to be 
met; following an instructional calendar or pacing plan; to 
align lessons to a specific standard; to have students help 
other students to learn standards; focusing instruction to 
standardized tests; to administer benchmarks; reviewing 
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students’ test results with other teachers; seeking help 
informally from other teachers; the decision to allocate 
time spend by students in assignments in school and at 
home; providing opportunities to students to spend more or 
less time in inquiry based learning; etc. Similar events 
were surveyed by the items found in the Spring 2009, School 
Personnel Survey, as part of the DATE evaluation final 
report study (Springer, et al., 2010). In a more recent 
study, teaching practice items include: increasing 
instructional time by lengthening the day, the year, or 
shortening recess; providing before or after school 
instruction or programs; organizing inquiry teams of 
teachers and administrators to address the needs of 
students; providing additional instruction to low-achieving 
students; increasing the use of student’s achievement data 
to inform instruction; teaching test-taking strategies; 
etc. (Marsh et al., 2011). 
Hence, drawing from the most recent research about 
performance-based compensation, the teaching practice 
construct was broadly considered for the purpose of the 
study; this construct encompasses the complexities of a 
multilayered process in which the teaching-learning process 
occurs in a school setting, as distinct from restricting it 
to the delivery of instruction inside a classroom. 
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Teachers’ Perceptions and Teaching Practice 
 
A vast literature exists on teachers’ perceptions in 
relation to many aspects of schooling, such as curriculum 
and perception, perception of students’ competence, 
perception and effectiveness of curriculum programs, and 
perception of self-efficacy, among others. This variety 
occurs not only in terms of the themes reached by the 
studies but also geographically, since teachers’ 
perceptions is a topic of research around the globe. 
Despite how diverse the scope of topic is and the location 
of the conducted investigations, there is a commonality 
among all the studies: they conclude teachers’ perceptions 
affect teaching practice. This is a robust motive to 
include teachers’ voice in research about performance based 
compensation programs. 
Teachers’ perceptions and teaching practice and curriculum 
The relationship among teaching practice, the area of 
curriculum, and teachers’ perceptions has been extensively 
studied. For example Hoang (2008) found how lead teachers’ 
perceptions of subject matter in elementary level both 
shaped and were shaped by their teaching strategies. Lead 
teachers’ strategies for improving instruction diverged 
according to whether they were working in math or literacy. 
So how they perceived subject matter directly influenced 
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the strategy chosen for improving instruction. In 
Australia, a study of Physical Education (PE) and 
curriculum found how pre-service and in-service teachers’ 
perceptions of PE determined their curriculum preferences 
(Morgan, 2008). The author concurs with previous research 
in which teacher perceptions impact their teaching and the 
effects become evident in their behaviors (Tabachnick & 
Zeichner, 1984 cited by Morgan, 2008). This becomes so 
predominantly manifest that a study conducted in Scotland 
by Burke, Williams, and Skinner (2007) concluded that 
teachers’ perceptions impacted what thinking skills are 
encouraged by teaching the mandated curriculum. 
Teachers’ perceptions of students’ competence and teaching 
practice 
Other area of research about teachers’ perceptions 
relates to how it affects teaching practices by affecting 
judgments of students’ competence. An article that describes 
an investigation of the relationship between the perception 
of teachers about Latino students’ social and academic 
competence and language proficiency and ethnicity (Edl, 
Jones, & Estell, 2008) found that teachers’ perceptions have 
a profound effect on how competent students are rated by 
their teachers.  This study shows how teachers’ perceptions 
affect their behavior in a teaching-learning process within a 
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classroom environment. In line with other studies that focus 
on how teachers’ perceptions may affect their teaching by 
rating their students’ competence, Auwarter and Aruguete 
(2008) examined how gender and socioeconomic status affected 
teachers’ perceptions and this, in turn, had an effect on 
their attitude toward students. Another study centered its 
attention to teachers’ perceptions of academic, social and 
behavioral competence of children with Speech Sound Disorders 
(Overby, Carrell, & Bernthal, 2007). The study found that 
teachers' academic, social, and behavioral expectations for 
children with speech disorders were significantly lower and 
qualitatively different than their expectations for typical 
second-grade speech sound production. By affecting ideas 
formation of children’s competence, perception would have a 
great impact on students’ expectations and teaching 
practice (Overby, Carrell, & Bernthal, 2007). 
Teachers’ perceptions of effectiveness of curriculum 
programs and teaching practice 
Teachers’ perceptions studies have also been conducted 
to understand the effectiveness of curriculum programs. 
Teaching practice becomes the catalyzer of how successful a 
curriculum program can be because a program that does not 
take into consideration teachers’ expectations, interests, 
and perceptions runs the risk of setting the stage for 
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failure (Lee, Ajayi, & Richards, 2007).  “Given that the 
teacher's theories, beliefs, educational knowledge, skills, 
and practical classroom experience typically serve as the 
basis for judgments and decisions about a program's 
workability and relevance” (Lee, Ajayi, & Richards, 2007, p. 
22), teachers’ role becomes critical to the success of a 
program. As expressed by an African scholar, “since 
perception is the foundation of all conception formation 
and learning, its importance should be realized in all 
teaching and learning activities” (Mukerjee, 1978 cited by 
Okecha, 2008, p. 562). 
Teachers’ perceptions of self-efficacy and teaching 
practice 
The perception of teachers about their self-efficacy 
has been reported to affect teaching practice. Albion 
(1999) affirms that research suggests that teachers' self-
efficacy beliefs about using technology for teaching are 
directly related to their practice. A self-efficacy 
perception study in Sweden found that how teachers perceive 
their self-efficacy in relation to their teaching of 
inclusive classes with mental retardation and dyslexia 
students affect their teaching practice (Roll-Peterson, 
2008). 
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In summary, the impact of teachers’ perceptions on 
different aspects of schooling has been studied and 
published. The studies reported that how teachers perceive 
these aspects of schooling affect their teaching practice, 
hence the importance of researching the degree of 
association between how teachers perceive an educational 
component (for example, alternative compensation for 
teachers) affect them, and the variables involved in that 
same educational component (money awarded, teachers 
characteristics, etc.). 
 
Impact of Teachers’ perceptions on Teaching Practice and 
Teachers’ Compensation 
Even though teachers’ perceptions are found to affect 
teachers’ practice of their profession, there have not been 
many studies conducted in recent years on how the teachers’ 
perceptions about alternative methods of compensating them 
affect their teaching practice.  Furthermore, this breach 
occurs in an educational environment where the 
implementation of alternative methods of compensation is 
becoming commonplace. Instead studies, mostly conducted 
during the 1990s, generally focused on whether or not 
teachers were against merit pay (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). 
Ballou and Podgursky, more in tune with the formal 
35 
 
 
 
rationality school of thought, challenged the idea that 
teachers oppose merit pay and affirmed that teachers were 
not demoralized by it. In addition, they averred that 
teachers working with disadvantaged and low-performing 
students were generally supportive of merit pay.  However 
these authors cite in their literature review that 
teachers' perceptions about fairness have been correct.  
Merit pay programs have been unfair, divisive and short-
lived (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). They are also unpopular 
among teachers and they have not worked in the past mainly 
because merit pay is not a motivator since it does not 
intrinsically enrich teachers’ tasks but pays more to do 
the same job better (Firestone, 1991). 
The bulk of studies about teachers’ perceptions on 
merit pay are more than a decade old. Moreover, they are 
regularly focused on whether or not teachers supported 
them, or on how successful they have been in terms of 
surviving certain time-span. However, these studies did not 
seek to analyze or identify the impact performance based 
alternative compensation had in schooling children. As 
portrayed in the literature review section dedicated to 
alternative pay for teachers, there are a few more recent 
studies about this issue, but they are scarce and their 
findings about how these programs affect motivation, 
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collaboration, and teaching practice are inconclusive. The 
most recent studies on performance-based compensation 
programs that have placed a more significant part of their 
attention on teachers’ perceptions about the impact of the 
programs on motivation, collaboration, and teaching 
practice, have shown no positive effect of these programs 
on teaching and teachers, as it was described in the 
literature review section on Alternative Methods of 
Compensation. 
 
 
Importance and Justification of this Topic of Research 
 
As suggested by the previous sections, there is enough 
evidence to assert that teachers’ perceptions affect how 
teachers exercise their trade. Proponents of implementing 
alternative methods of compensating teachers, which seem to 
be part of the array of mechanisms being tried out with the 
aim of attaining a comprehensive school reform, argued 
about the positive effects of those methods. To this end, 
compensating teachers differently than the single schedule 
pay would attract better qualified professionals and will 
help with retention efforts of good teachers. By extension, 
they conclude better teachers will provide better education 
to students. But not much input from teachers appears to be 
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part of this effort to introducing new mechanisms for 
school reform, as it is alternative pay for teachers. As 
stated by a former teacher and union representative, and 
advisor to the Denver School District Superintendent, “with 
the exception of Public’s Agenda Report6, Stand by Me, I 
have found little research on teachers’ perceptions of 
alternative compensation” (Jupp, 2005, p. 10) in spite of 
teachers being a major stakeholder in the implementation of 
such programs. Teachers’ voice needs to be included in 
research about how these methods of compensation affect 
them and their practice. 
Still, there is not much research about the perception 
of stakeholders about the implementation of alternative pay 
programs for teachers and their impact on teachers’ 
exercise of their profession. 
Studies conducted in regard to merit pay or pay for 
performance are mainly focused on the impact they have had 
on aggregated data studies of student achievement based on 
standardized tests (Kelley, Conley, & Kimball, 2000; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). But not even these studies 
are conclusive without controversy since there is little 
empirical evidence on their impact on student achievement 
                     
 
6
 This Public’s Agenda Report “Stand by Me” refers to Farkas, S., Johnson, J., and Duffett, A. (2003).  
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(Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002). The latest studies in 
the US show no positive effect on student outcomes (Gratz, 
2011), even though an international comparison across 
countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) study showed evidence of the 
association between performance-related teacher pay and 
student achievement (Woessmann, 2011). 
Interestingly enough, teachers’ perceptions have 
remained unstudied within this topic of research until most 
recently. Previous studies have their conclusions about 
alternative pay programs’ implementations be drawn from 
students’ tests results almost exclusively, implying 
apparently that the reason to implement such programs is to 
increase students’ scores in standardized tests rather than 
improving education. Studies on student achievement based 
on value-added data have shown that teacher effects in 
school districts and within schools are unrelated to 
teacher’s characteristics such as type of certification, 
teacher’s level of education, licensing exam scores, and 
years of experience beyond 2 years of teaching (Podgursky & 
Springer, 2006, 2007). However, the principal investigator 
found no studies in regard to how teachers’ characteristics 
relate to teachers’ perceptions about the impact of 
alternative pay on teaching practice. 
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Grineski (2005a) suggests that families, principals 
and teachers should be included as interested parties in 
the design and implementation of school reform programs. 
But this did not seem to be the case about alternative 
compensation for teachers. However “After all, teachers are 
the ones doing the doing. Their views should be taken very 
seriously” (Farkas, S., Johnson, J., & Duffett, A., 2003, 
p. 9). 
A main reason to include teachers’ voice in studies 
regarding these programs is that no much improvement of 
educating children has resulted from research in this 
topic. Says Grineski (2005a): including the ideologically 
charged A Nation at Risk, “the educational landscape is 
littered with misguided and de-contextualized reform plans 
that have had little success in improving schooling” (p. 
110). 
Another reason to incorporate teachers’ perspective on 
alternative methods of compensation in education is that 
“when teachers (...) are confronted with a new policy, 
their interpretations of it will determine whether they 
engage in significant change, incremental change, or 
resistance” (Seashore, Febey, & Schroeder, 2005, p. 178). 
So the inclusion of teachers’ perceptions may have major 
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implications in the longitudinal implementation of 
educational policy. 
Therefore it is relevant to examine the relation 
between key variables of the education system (such as 
compensating teachers) and how the teachers’ perceptions of 
those variables may affect their teaching practice. The 
study conducted was an investigation that sought to 
identify how teachers’ perceptions about the impact of an 
alternative compensation program on collaboration among 
teachers, teachers’ motivation, and teaching practice were 
associated to some key independent variables, such as money 
received from the program as alternative pay and teachers’ 
characteristics (age, ethnicity, certification, etc.). 
 
  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used for the 
study.  The first section summarizes the purpose, general 
characteristics, and research questions of the study. The 
next section depicts the research design. It is followed by 
a section describing the participants and sampling 
procedures, followed by a section on instrumentation. Then 
procedures to collect the data and the data analysis are 
addressed and the chapter ends with a section describing 
limitations of the study. 
 
Purpose of the Study and General Characteristics 
The purpose of the study was to describe teachers’ 
perceptions of the impact that one alternative method of 
compensating teachers implemented in a large urban school 
district has had on their collaboration, motivation, and 
teaching practice. Teachers’ perceptions data were 
collected by an original instrument developed by the 
principal investigator intended to provide scaled scores of 
perception of the impact of the compensation program on 
collaboration, motivation, and teaching practice. 
The study addressed the following research questions: 
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1) “Do the hypothesized conceptual dimensions, 
collaboration, motivation, and teaching practice, 
correspond with the dimensions (factors) derived from 
the data collected with the original survey 
administered for the study?” 
2) “To what extent do each of a series of variables (the 
amount of money awarded to teachers by the program, 
years of teaching experience, years of teaching at 
current campus, age, ethnicity, type of teaching 
certification, path for teacher certification, and 
school level/subject taught) relate to the perceived 
effects of alternative compensation on teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration, if at all?” 
 
Research Design 
 
A survey research design was used for the study 
because its purpose was to examine perceptions of a large 
group of people about a particular issue. In this study, 
the large group of people was a group of teachers employed 
by a single school district and the issue was the 
perception of how a performance pay plan affected their 
motivation, collaboration, and teaching practice. 
Therefore, a survey research design suited the aims of the 
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research’s object of study since the major purpose of a 
survey is to gather data from a sample to describe the 
characteristics of a population (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008). 
In order to answer the research questions, a cross-
sectional survey was used. A cross-sectional survey is a 
methodology utilized to collect information from a sample 
that has been drawn from a specific population and the 
information is collected at just one point in time 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 2008). 
 
Participants and Sampling Procedures 
 
Participants for the study were drawn from the 
population of teachers of Fort Bend Independent School 
District, in the Houston (Texas) metropolitan area. 
With over 9,200 employees, including more than 4,000 
teachers and more than 69,000 students Fort Bend ISD is the 
7
th
 largest school district in Texas (Fort Bend Independent 
School District, 2011). It can be considered a major urban 
school district. This district was selected because schools 
in FBISD have implemented performance pay plans for 
teachers under the umbrella of District Awards for Teacher 
Excellence (DATE). Twenty-three elementary and middle 
school campuses participated in the DATE performance-based 
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compensation program. As shown in Table 1, these campuses 
service 17,269 students where 973 teachers are employed 
(TEA, 2011b). 
 
Table 1 
 
Campuses in Fort Bend ISD under DATE program 
 
 
Level     Schools     Enrollment  Teachers 
 
 
Elementary 19           13,661   727 
 
 
Middle   4            3,608   246 
 
 
Total  23          17,269   973 
 
 
Note. Data from Fort Bend Independent School District (2011a) and Texas 
Education Agency (2011b). 
 
 
Permission to conduct research in this district was 
given in a form of an email from the Department of 
Accountability and Program Evaluation of Fort Bend ISD (see 
Appendix A for approval email).  
The principal investigator did not have access to 
contact potential participants directly. The Department of 
Accountability and Program Evaluation, following guidelines 
set by the inclusion and the exclusion criteria established 
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below, forwarded all documentation for the study to 
campuses’ principals. Then principals forwarded the 
documentation to teachers. 
The population of potential participants recruited for 
the study was all certified teachers in charge of 
instructing children in a DATE funded campus. The employees 
excluded were administrators, support staff (nurses, 
instructional coordinators, reading coaches, etc.), 
substitute teachers, teacher assistants, teacher aides, and 
any Fort Bend ISD employee who was not an acting teacher 
currently in charge of instructing students in a school 
setting which had implemented alternative compensation 
funded by the DATE grant. 
Principal investigator received confirmation from the 
Department of Accountability and Program Evaluation that 
the study documentation was sent to all DATE campuses. 
However, the principal investigator had no way to confirm 
whether or not all teachers received the documentation, 
creating a difficulty in reporting an accurate rate of 
response. 
The instrument was posted online at surveymonkey.com, 
and 241 total teachers responded. From these, 1 potential 
participant opted to answer not to give consent. In 
addition, other 21 potential participants gave their 
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consent but did not answer any item of the instrument. All 
those 22 potential participants were removed from the data 
file, leaving the total number of respondents at 219. 
The distribution of teacher participants grouped by 
age, as shown in Figure 2, included 36 teachers (17.2%) 30 
years old and younger, 66 teachers (31.6%) in the age group 
31-40 years old, 56 teachers (26.8%) in the age group 41-50 
years old, 41 teachers (19.6%) in the age group 51-60 years 
old, and 10 teachers (4.8%) 61 years old and older, 
constituting a total of 209 respondents. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Number of Teachers Respondents Grouped by Age 
 
 
Participants consisted of 87 African-American teachers 
(40.3%), 81 Caucasian teachers (37.5%), 30 Hispanic 
teachers (13.9%), 12 Asian teachers (5.6%), and 6 teachers 
31-40
41-50
51-60
≤ 30 
≥ 61 
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reported other ethnicities (2.7%), including Native 
American or multiracial. Figure 3 shows teacher 
participants ethnicity as percentage of 216 total 
respondents. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Proportion of Teachers Participants by Ethnicity 
 
 With a minimum of 1 year of experience and a maximum 
of 30 years of experience, Table 2 shows descriptive 
statistics for the respondents with averages above 11 years 
of teaching experience and more than 6 years of experience 
at the current campus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
African-American
Caucasian
Hispanic
Asian
Other
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Table 2 
Teachers’ Years of Teaching Experience 
 
         N        Mean       Median       Mode      SD 
 
 
Years of 
Teaching 
Experience  214      11.63        10           5       7.82 
 
 
Years in 
Current   
Campus      213       6.75         5           3       5.88 
 
 
 
Instrumentation 
The study utilized a researcher-designed Likert scale 
response survey. The survey allowed participants to state 
varying degrees of their perception on how the performance 
pay plan has affected their teaching practice, motivation, 
and collaboration. Participants answered to what extent 
they agreed or disagreed with each item in a continuum of 5 
response-options with statements that reflected the 
underlying variables to be measured by the instrument: the 
perceived effects of alternative pay on teaching practice, 
motivation, and collaboration. Attitudinal responses are 
most appropriately measured with Likert-scale items 
(Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen, 2004). Hence, a Likert-
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scale response-format corresponded with the purpose of the 
study. 
Piloting of the Instrument before the study 
 The instrument was first administrated to a convenient 
sample of 61 elementary school teachers employed by a 
Houston metropolitan area school district. The response 
rate was 100%. It was administered on paper during a 
faculty meeting where participants responded to the 
instrument and turn it in right afterwards during the 
faculty meeting. 
The face and content validities of the original 
instrument were confirmed during the development of the 
scales by teacher-colleagues and a methodology professor 
from the Doctoral Program in Education at the University of 
Houston (Houston, Texas) in quality of experts. In 
addition, latent variables addressed by the scales were 
derived from the literature, increasing the construct 
validity. Collaboration, motivation and teaching practice 
are factors measured in studies published in peer-reviewed 
journals about how teachers perceived performance pay 
affected their work. This is shown by the emerging 
literature reporting teachers’ perceptions about the impact 
of performance-based pay on collaboration, motivation, and 
teaching practice cited in the literature review section. 
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 The instrument was built with 5 items per factor. 
Three items per factor were written following a positive 
statement format and two were written in a negative format. 
The order of the items was randomly assigned in the 
instrument. 
 The participants’ responses were manually entered in 
Excel and SPSS was used to process the factorization 
techniques. 
The original piloted instrument showed internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha) at α=.774 for teaching 
practice and α=.756 for motivation when it was 
administrated for the first time, prior to data collection 
for the study. While teaching practice and motivation 
showed somewhat strong reliability values, collaboration 
showed a reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha) at 
α=.381. Two items within the collaboration scale were 
modified (see Appendix B for modifications of items). The 
new reliability coefficient after administering the revised 
survey for the present study showed α=.631 and α=.646 on 
standardized items, as described in more details in the 
results sections.  
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Data Collection Procedures 
 
Teachers working on campuses which have implemented 
performance pay funded by the DATE grant were the potential 
participants for the study. 
All documentation, approved by the University of 
Houston Institutional Review Board, was sent to the 
Department of Accountability and Program Evaluation of Fort 
Bend ISD via email. First, a letter inviting teachers to 
voluntarily participate in a study by answering a survey 
(see Appendix C for Letter of invitation to participate in 
research) was sent via email. After confirmation from the 
Department of Accountability and Program Evaluation that 
the letter of invitation had been sent, a recruitment 
script was sent (see Appendix D for Recruitment Script). 
The recruitment script offered potential participants to 
request Research participants’ rights and a letter of 
consent from the principal investigator (See Appendix E for 
Research participants’ rights and letter of consent). The 
link to the survey (surveymonkey.com) was included in the 
recruitment script (see Appendix F for Instrument). The 
window to answer the survey opened on a Monday and it was 
extended to the Friday of the third week, for a total of 19 
days. Two reminders were sent out via email on the eighth 
and on the seventeenth day respectively. The participants’ 
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responses were downloaded directly from surveymonkey.com in 
to an Excel file to be used in SPSS and process the 
pertinent statistical techniques. 
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
 
The data analysis plan utilized to analyze the data 
collected was twofold: 
(1) Factorization techniques were processed to confirm 
the instrument’s underlying constructs and the reliability 
of the scales. 
These techniques were used to answer research question 
1: “Do the hypothesized conceptual dimensions, teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration, correspond with 
the dimensions (factors) derived from the data collected 
with the original survey administered for the study?” 
 
 (2) Multiple linear regression models were processed 
to describe the extent of the association between the 
amounts of money awarded to teachers by the performance pay 
program and the perceived effects of alternative 
compensation on collaboration, motivation, and teaching 
practice. 
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These models were used to answer research question 2: 
“To what extent do each of a series of variables (the 
amount of money awarded to teachers by the program, years 
of teaching experience, years of teaching at current 
campus, age, ethnicity, type of teaching certification, 
path for teacher certification, and school level/subject 
taught) relate to the perceived effects of alternative 
compensation on teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration, if at all?” 
The dependent variables in the regression models were 
the perceived impact of the Performance Pay Plan on 
teaching practice, the perceived impact of the Performance 
Pay Plan on motivation, and the perceived impact of the 
Performance Pay Plan on collaboration as measured by the 
summated scales created from the teachers’ responses to the 
instrument. 
The independent variables’ measures were self-reported 
by participants during the data collection via the survey 
instrument. Five Likert scale response options were 
configured in the instrument: Strongly disagree, Disagree, 
Neither agree nor disagree, Agree, and Strongly agree. The 
Likert scale response options were considered to be 
equidistant. The summated scales were developed assigning 
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responses values from 1 point to Strongly Disagree to 5 
points to Strongly Agree. 
The regression models used follow: 
y₁ = α + β₁x₁ + β₂x₂ + β₃x₃ + β₄x₄ + β₅x₅ + β₆ x₆ + β₇x₇ + β₈x₈ + β₉x₉ +ξ 
 
y₂ = α + β₁x₁ + β₂x₂ + β₃x₃ + β₄x₄ + β₅x₅ + β₆ x₆ + β₇x₇ + β₈x₈ + β₉x₉ +ξ 
 
y₃ = α + β₁x₁ + β₂x₂ + β₃x₃ + β₄x₄ + β₅x₅ + β₆ x₆ + β₇x₇ + β₈x₈ + β₉x₉ +ξ 
 
 
Where: 
y₁ is the estimated teaching practice value 
y₂ is the estimated motivation value 
y₃ is the estimated collaboration value 
α is constant (intercept) 
β₁x₁ is the estimated money awarded by the Performance 
Pay Plan in the current year 
β₂x₂  is the estimated money awarded by the Performance 
Pay Plan in the previous year 
β₃x₃ is the estimated years of teaching experience 
β₄x₄ is the estimated years of experience in current 
campus 
β₅x₅ is the estimated measured age 
β₆x₆ is the estimated measured teacher certification 
β₇x₇ is the estimated measured teacher certification 
β₈x₈ is the estimated measured grade taught 
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β₉x₉ is the estimated measured age 
ξ is the estimated error 
 
The ninety-five confidence level (p <.05) was used as 
the criterion to determine statistical significance. 
An Exploratory Data Analysis to check that the data 
set followed a Gaussian normal distribution curve was 
conducted. Descriptive Statistics in SPSS Normality plot 
with tests was processed to check the data set was unimodal 
and symmetric. Because the results were not conclusive, 
Normal P-P Plots of Regression Standardized Residuals for 
the 3 scales were processed. 
Missing data were assumed to be at random. Missing 
data were treated using pairwise option in SPSS in the 
regression models. Listwise deletion based on all variables 
was used for Reliability Case Processing in all 
factorization techniques. 
 
Limitations of the study 
Validity of the study may be threatened due to the 
nature of not selecting a random sample from the study 
population.  There is no assumption of generalizability of 
the results beyond the population from where the sample was 
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drawn. The predictable value of the findings relates solely 
to DATE campuses in the district where the data were 
collected. In addition, the conclusions from this study are 
limited by the associative nature of the study and its use 
of multiple linear regression models in the data analysis. 
As with any survey design research, the data for the 
scales were self-reported, so there is no guarantee that 
the actual responses reflect what the participants truly 
perceive as to the way the money affected their teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration, and this may 
threaten the validity of the study. 
Other extraneous variables not considered in the 
regression models of this study may have effects on the 
dependent variables. Environmental, social, and personal 
factors not considered in the study may contribute to 
determine teachers’ perceptions about how performance pay 
affects their teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration. 
The principal investigator did not have direct access 
to participants. So even though there was the confirmation 
from the Fort Bend ISD Evaluation and Accountability 
department about delivering all documentation related to 
the study to all campuses’ principals, there is no 
guarantee that all teachers received it. 
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After the factorization techniques were processed, the 
Collaboration scale ended up being formed by 3 items and 
its coefficient of reliability Alpha did not meet the value 
threshold of .65. This limitation to the study is further 
examined in the Discussion section of Chapter Five. 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to describe teachers’ 
perceptions of the impact that one alternative method of 
compensating teachers implemented in a large urban school 
district has had on their collaboration, motivation, and 
teaching practice. In order to achieve this purpose, the 
study addressed two research questions. 
(1) “Do the hypothesized conceptual dimensions -teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration- correspond 
with the dimensions (factors) derived from the data 
collected with the original survey administered for 
the study?” 
(2) “To what extent do each of a series of variables 
(the amount of money awarded to teachers by the 
program, years of teaching experience, years of 
teaching at current campus, age, ethnicity, type of 
teaching certification, path for teacher 
certification, and school level/subject taught) 
relate to the perceived effects of alternative 
compensation on teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration, if at all?” 
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In order to answer the first research question, 
factorization techniques were processed to confirm that the 
hypothesized conceptual dimensions -teaching practice, 
motivation, and collaboration- correspond with the 
dimensions (factors) derived from the data collected with 
the original survey administered for the study. 
In order to answer the second research question, 
simultaneous multiple linear regression models were 
processed to describe the extent of the association between 
the amounts of money awarded to teachers by the performance 
pay program and the perceived effects of alternative 
compensation on teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration. 
This chapter presents the results obtained when the 
above statistical techniques were processed. 
 
Results Obtained for Research Question 1 
Table 3 shows that all 3 scales passed the threshold 
for Determinant and Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO). A 
determinant other than 0 (zero) indicates there is no 
problem with the data used to compute the scales. A number 
close to 0 (zero) may indicate there is a redundancy of 
data. Teaching Practice Determinant at .307, Motivation 
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Determinant at .178, and Collaboration Determinant at .502 
show there is no redundancy, and therefore, enough variance 
exists in the data used to develop the scales.
7
 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is a test statistic to 
check the hypothesis that the variables’ correlation matrix 
differs from an identity matrix.  The matrices for the 3  
5-item scales are different from an identity matrix as 
revealed by the statistically significant differences shown 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Teaching Practice, Motivation, and Collaboration: 
Determinant, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (KMO), and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
 
                   Teaching     Motivation    Collaboration 
                   Practice 
 
Determinant            .307           .178             .502 
KMO                    .739           .801             .579 
 
 
Bartlett's Test            
of Sphericity              
                           
Approx. Chi-Square  247.783        358.461          143.610 
 
df                       10             10               10 
 
Sig.                   <.01           <.01             <.01 
 
Note: Principal Component Analysis with a fixed 3 unrotated factors 
extraction. 
                     
 
7 Teaching Practice, Motivation, and Collaboration items are named TP1 
through TP5, M1 through M5, and C1 through C5 respectively. See 
Appendix G for Instrument Items’ Key. 
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Communalities represent the extent to which each item 
shares variance with the other items. Table 4 shows that 
the communalities for each variable in the Teaching 
Practice scale are substantially explained for by all the 
factors in conjunction. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Communalities for each variable in Teaching Practice scale 
 
  Communality 
Variable    Initial      Extraction 
 
  TP1     1.000     .852 
  TP2     1.000     .725 
  TP3     1.000     .743 
  TP4     1.000     .750 
  TP5     1.000     .997 
 
Five items make up the summated scale Teaching 
Practice: TP1, TP2, TP3, TP4, and TP5. The results showed 
the scale passed the threshold for Determinant, with value 
of .307, and the Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) with 
value of .739, and a statistically significant Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity value: x²(10, N = 219) = 247.78, p <.01. 
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Table 5 
 
Loading Factors for Teaching Practice items 
Component Matrix 
    Component 
  1     2     3 
TP1  .584   .612 -.369 
TP2  .609  -.584  .118 
TP3  .810  -.242 -.167 
TP4  .846  -.029 -.180 
TP5  .616   .355  .701 
 
Table 5 shows Teaching Practice items TP2, TP3, TP4, 
and TP5 have a high correlation (above .60), or loading 
factors, on factor 1 while item TP1 has a correlation of 
.584 on this factor.  
Reliability Case Processing Summary for all Teaching 
Practice’s 5 items showed 213 valid cases, Cronbach’s Alpha 
.730 and Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized items .733. 
Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure 
was used. 
DeVellis (2003) suggests a factor loading .5 and Alpha 
value minimal threshold of .65 as acceptable for developing 
a scale. The five items in Teaching Practice passed the 
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factor loading minimal values, and the scale showed a 
reliability Alpha value  α = .730. 
These results indicate that the summated scale 
Teaching Practice is an adequate instrument to measure 
teachers’ perceptions about how a performance pay bonus 
impacted their teaching practice. However, some items 
showed complex structure, or cross loading across factors, 
suggesting these items may explain other latent variables. 
This constitutes a limitation on the scale’s explanatory 
power, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 Five items make up the summated scale Motivation: 
M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5. The results shown on Table 3 
indicate the scale passed the threshold for Determinant, 
with value of .178, and the Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
(KMO) with value of .801, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
statistically significant:  x²(10, N = 219) = 358.46, p 
<.01. 
Table 6 shows the Communalities for the Motivation 
scale. 
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Table 6 
 
Communalities for each variable in Motivation scale 
 
  Communality 
Variable    Initial      Extraction 
 
  M1      1.000       .983 
  M2      1.000     .981 
  M3      1.000     .800 
  M4      1.000     .740 
  M5      1.000       .804 
 
 
Table 6 shows that a substantial proportion of the 
variance of each variable in the Motivation scale, is 
explained for by all the factors in conjunction. 
 
Table 7 
 
Loading Factors for Motivation items 
Component Matrix 
     
Component 
  1     2     3 
M1  .480   .867 -.028 
M2  .708  -.043  .691 
M3  .852  -.143 -.233 
M4  .808  -.032 -.038 
M5  .847   .355 -.292 
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Table 7 shows Motivation items M2, M3, M4, and M5 have 
a high correlation (above .70) on factor 1. However, item 
M1 shows a loading factor on factor 1 slightly below the .5 
mark suggested by DeVellis (2003). 
Reliability Case Processing Summary for all 
Motivation’s 5 items showed 211 valid cases, Cronbach’s 
Alpha .790 and Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized items 
.797. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure was used. 
These results indicate that the summated scale 
Motivation is an adequate instrument to measure teachers’ 
perceptions about how a performance pay bonus impacted 
their motivation. However, some items showed complex 
structure suggesting these items may explain other latent 
variables. This feature of the scale constitutes a 
limitation on the scale’s explanatory power, which will be 
addressed in the next chapter. Still, although item M1 
loading factor value was slightly below the suggested value 
of .5, the reliability coefficient α = .790 suggests that 
the summated scale including item M1 remains adequate as a 
measurement instrument for the latent variable Motivation. 
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Table 8 shows Communalities for the Collaboration 
scale. 
Table 8 
Communalities for each variable in 5-item Collaboration 
scale 
 
  Communality 
Variable    Initial      Extraction 
 
  C1      1.000       .726 
  C2      1.000     .956 
  C3      1.000     .742 
  C4      1.000     .723 
  C5      1.000       .811 
 
 
Table 8 shows the considerable extent to which each 
item shares variance with the other items. 
 
Table 9 
Loading Factors for 5-item Collaboration  
Component Matrix 
 
    Component 
   1     2     3 
C1   .341  .747  .228 
C2   .619 -.303  .693 
C3  -.017  .850  .015 
C4   .836  .001 -.210 
C5   .796 -.067 -.417 
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Table 9 shows Collaboration items C2, C4, and C5 have 
a correlation above .60 on factor 1. While Item C1 shows a 
loading factor of .341 on factor 1, item C3 shows a 
correlation of -.017 with factor 1. 
Reliability Case Processing Summary for all 5 items in 
Collaboration showed 212 valid cases, Cronbach’s Alpha .495 
and Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized items .499. 
Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure 
was used. 
Item C3 was removed from the scale due to a low 
correlation with factor 1 while showing a strong positive 
correlation with factor 2. After deletion of item C3, a new 
round of factorization techniques for the new 4-item scale 
was processed. 
The 4-item scale showed Determinant value equal to 
.606, and Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) of .622, and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity x²(6, N = 214) = 105.654, p < 
.01. 
Table 10 shows the Communalities for items C1, C2, C4, 
and C5. 
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Table 10 
 
Communalities for each variable in 4-item Collaboration 
scale 
 
  Communality 
Variable    Initial      Extraction 
 
  C1      1.000       .999 
  C2      1.000     .990 
  C4      1.000     .745 
  C5      1.000       .808 
 
 
Table 11 shows the Loading Factors for items C1, C2, 
C4, and C5. 
 
Table 11 
 
Loading Factors for 4-item Collaboration 
Component Matrix 
    Component 
   1     2     3 
C1   .352  .896  .268 
C2   .836 -.394  .677 
C4   .794 -.053 -.210 
C5   .613 -.038 -.421 
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The Case Processing Summary showed a Cronbach’s Alpha 
value at .558 and a Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized 
items at .572 with 214 cases. Listwise deletion based on 
all variables in the procedure was used. 
Item C1 was removed from the 4-item scale due to a low 
correlation with factor 1 while showing a strong 
correlation with factor 2. After processing a new round of 
factorization techniques, the scale showed Determinant 
.628, Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) of .602, and a 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity  x²(3, N = 214) = 98.794, p < 
.01. 
Table 12 shows the Communalities for items C2, C4, and 
C5. 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Communalities for each variable in 3-item Collaboration 
scale 
 
  Communality 
Variable    Initial      Extraction 
 
  C2      1.000     1.000 
  C4      1.000     1.000 
  C5      1.000       1.000 
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Table 12 shows that the solution for this factor 
resulted in communalities equal to 1. This may mean that 
there is a problem with the quantity of data or the numbers 
of factors extracted. This solution adds a limitation to 
the interpretability of the scale as a measure of the 
latent variable. 
Table 13 shows the Loading Factors for items C2, C4, 
and C5. 
 
Table 13 
 
Loading Factors for 3-item Collaboration 
Component Matrix 
    Component 
   1     2     3 
C2   .841  .758  .098 
C4   .803 -.203 -.501 
C5   .645 -.396  .446 
 
 
The Case Processing Summary showed a Cronbach’s Alpha 
value at .631 and a Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized 
items value at .646 with 215 cases. 
The factorization techniques results for the scale 
Collaboration produced two items (C1 and C3) to be 
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discarded from the original scale’s pool of items. Three 
items remained in the summated scale: C2, C4, and C5. The 
results showed the 3-item scale passed the threshold for 
Determinant, with value of .502, and the Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (KMO) with value of .579, and a 
statistically significant Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: 
x²(10, N = 214) = 143.601, p < .01. 
The 3 items passed the factor loading minimal values 
and the scale showed a reliability Alpha value α = .631.  
These results indicate that the findings concluded 
from the summated scale Collaboration should be analyzed 
with caution. Even though the scale passed most of the 
thresholds set for an adequate instrument, the scale is 
formed by 3 items and its reliability coefficient was 
slightly below .65. Further, the 3-item scale communalities 
extracted resulted in values equal to one, which could 
indicate a problem with the quantity of data or the number 
of factors processed. This cautionary conclusion will be 
addressed in more detail in the discussions of the next 
chapter. 
Table 14 shows the reliability value for each item in 
the summated scales Teaching Practice, Motivation, and 
Collaboration, and the overall Alpha value for each scale. 
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Table 14 
Reliability value for Teaching Practice, Motivation, and 
Collaboration and Factor Loadings across items 
     Factor   
Scale Item   Loading    α 
 
Teaching Practice      .739 
  TP1   .584 
  TP2   .609 
  TP3   .810 
  TP4   .846 
  TP5   .616 
Motivation       .834 
  M1   .480 
  M2   .708 
  M3   .852 
  M4   .808 
  M5   .847 
Collaboration       .631 
  C2   .841 
  C4   .803 
  C5   .645 
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Results Obtained for Research Question 2 
Test for Normality Kolmogorov-Smirnov suggested the 
scales’ data sets were not normally distributed with a 
significance level p < .01. However, an exploratory 
analysis with descriptive statistics and plots in SPSS 
showed the data for each of the three scales did have 
enough features to be treated as normal distributions. As 
shown in Table 15 Skewness and Kurtosis for the 3 scales 
show the data are within the range of below 1 Skewness, and 
Kurtosis of absolute value below .7. 
 
Table 15 
Test for Normality and Descriptives for scales Teaching 
Practice, Motivation, and Collaboration 
 Test of Normality and Descriptives        
   Kolmogorov-Smirnov        Descriptives 
Statistic    Sig.       Skewness  Kurtosis  
TP  .103     <.01        .380  -.570 
M  .097     <.01        .502  -.330 
C  .110     <.01     -.495   .281 
 
Due to the ambiguous results of the normality tests, 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for the 
3 scales was processed. Normal P-P Plot is a technique to 
graphically assess whether or not a data set is 
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approximately normally distributed. The data set is graphed 
over a theoretical line of a normally distributed data. The 
data set being assessed should form an approximate straight 
line along the theoretical line, drawn by SPSS at a 45 
degree angle on a plot graph. 
The results showed normal distribution for Teaching 
Practice, normal distribution for Motivation, and normal 
distribution for Collaboration. As shown in Figure 4, 
Figure 5, and Figure 6, the points of the three scales’ 
plots form a nearly linear pattern. This is a good 
indication that the normal distribution is a good model for 
the data sets. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for 
Teaching Practice 
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Figure 5 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual for 
Collaboration 
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The regression model for variables predicting Teaching 
Practice showed R = .38, R² = .15, adjusted R² = .03 and a 
Standard Error of the Estimate equal to 3.29. The ANOVA for 
the regression model showed F(23, 173) = 1.29, p > .05. 
These results indicate that the relationship between 
the criterion variable and the predictors is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, no statistically 
significant linear relationship of teachers’ perceptions of 
the impact that the alternative method of compensation had 
on their teaching practice and the independent variables 
was found. 
The regression model for variables predicting 
Motivation showed R = .42, R² = .18, adjusted R² = .07 and 
a Standard Error of the Estimate equal to 3.75. The ANOVA 
for the regression model showed F(23, 171) = 1.58, p = .05. 
These results indicate that the relationship between 
the dependent variable Motivation and the predictors is 
statistically significant at 95% confidence level. 
Therefore, the model showed a statistically significant 
linear relationship of teachers’ perceptions of the impact 
that the alternative method of compensation had on their 
motivation and the independent variables. 
Table 16 shows the summary of the regression model for 
the variables predicting Motivation, where only two 
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predictors influenced significantly how teachers perceive 
the impact of alternative compensation on their motivation. 
These variables are: Ethnicity Asian and Age. 
Ethnicity Asian independent variable showed B = 3.08 
and β = .18 at significance level p < .05. Because 
Ethnicity was a dummy coded variable using White as the 
reference, the results show how Asian teachers compare to 
White teachers in terms of the impact that the program’s 
monies have on their motivation. These results suggest that 
Asian teachers feel on average that the monies form the 
program increase their motivation 18% more than White 
teachers. The recent literature does not address how money 
from performance pay programs impact teachers differently 
based on their ethnicity. 
Age independent variable showed B = -0.14 and β = -.40 
at significance level p < .01. The results indicate that 
for every year of increment in age, the perception of the 
impact of bonus money on motivation decrease by 0.14 units, 
all other variables remaining constant. The recent 
literature does not address specifically how money from 
performance pay programs impact differently teachers based 
on their age. Marsh et al. (2011) mentioned that recent 
research indicates that educators’ experience and age 
affect attitudes towards performance-based financial 
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rewards. They cite Springer et. al. (2009) to exemplify the 
differences between inexperienced and experienced teachers 
about how much educators support rewards programs. However, 
the authors offer no citation related to how age does. 
 
Table 16 
Summary of Simultaneous Regression Analysis for Variables  
Predicting Motivation 
     
 Variable                    B   SE    β 
 
Teach 3
rd
 to 5
th
 Grade 
 
-0.42 
 
0.73 
 
-.05 
 
Teach 6-8 Across Subjects 0.21 1.25 .01  
Teach 6-8 Language Arts 1.23 1.75 .06  
Teach 6-8 Mathematics 0.78 1.56 .04  
Teach 6-8 Science 2.45 2.05 .10  
Teach 6-8 Social Studies -0.11 2.47 -.00  
Teach other 0.66 0.90 .07  
Ethnicity Asian 3.08 1.27 .18 * 
Ethnicity African-Am 0.29 0.67 .04  
Ethnicity Latino 0.09 1.16 .01  
Ethnicity other 1.40 1.41 .08  
Cert Bilingual 0.29 1.53 .02  
Cert Second Core Subject -2.40 1.63 -.16  
Cert Multiple Certification -0.36 0.71 -.04  
Cert other -1.03 1.02 -.09  
Through ACP 0.51 0.70 .06  
Through Deficiency Plan 1.49 1.92 .06  
Through Other 0.83 1.70 .04  
Teaching Experience 0.04 0.06 .07  
Tech. Exp. at campus 0.04 0.06 .06     
Age -0.14 0.04 -.40 ** 
Received Bonus Current Year 0.00 0.00 .10  
Received Bonus Previous Year 0.00 0.00 -.09  
 
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01 
The regression model for variables predicting 
Collaboration showed R = .37, R² = .14, adjusted R² = .02 
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and a Standard Error of the Estimate equal to 2.36. The 
Analysis of Variance statistics for the regression model 
showed F(23, 173) = 1.18,   p > .05. 
These results indicate that the relationship between 
the criterion variable and the predictors is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, no statistically 
significant linear relationship of teachers’ perceptions of 
the impact that the alternative method of compensation had 
on their collaboration and the independent variables was 
found. 
These results go against the theory of action proposed 
by the implementation of these programs which seek to 
enhance collaboration, among other benefits (Marsh et al. 
2011).  The model did not show any positive influence of 
money from the incentive program over teachers’ 
collaboration as perceived by the teachers themselves. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to describe teachers’ 
perceptions of the impact that one alternative method of 
compensating teachers implemented in a large urban school 
district has had on their collaboration, motivation, and 
teaching practice. In order to achieve this purpose, the 
study addressed two Research Questions: the first question 
is related to the underline structure of the data, and the 
second question is related to the degree of association 
between the teachers’ perceptions measured by the summated 
scales and the independent variables. The results involving 
Research Question 1 and Research Question 2 are discussed 
next. 
 
Discussion about Research Question 1 
The first Research Question addressed by the study 
was, “Do the hypothesized conceptual dimensions, teaching 
practice, motivation, and collaboration correspond with the 
dimensions (factors) derived from the data collected with 
the original survey administered for the study?” 
The main objective sought by answering this question 
was to find the underline structure of the data in order to 
assess the reliability of the survey instrument. 
81 
 
 
 
The results of the study showed that the scales 
developed from the survey’s items are adequate to be used 
in studies intended to measure the latent constructs, 
namely the teachers’ perceptions of the impact of extra 
compensation money on Teaching Practice, Motivation, and 
Collaboration. These scales could be a good pathway to 
develop more detailed and specific instruments to measure 
such constructs in more concrete and complex terms, such as 
how money from alternative compensation programs affect 
specific tasks teachers perform as seeing by the teachers 
themselves. For example, Teaching Practice could be 
measured in more specific subcategories by developing 
scales measuring teacher’s perceptions of the impact of 
money on Planning, Delivery of instruction, Materials used 
for instruction, and Evaluation of students’ performance. 
Such efforts have already begun, as shown in Marsh et al. 
(2011) and Springer et al (2008, 2009, 2010), even though 
these last 3 studies are program evaluations of TEEG, GEEG, 
and DATE respectively rather than research properly 
speaking. 
One of the conclusions about the scales was that the 
Collaboration scale ended up being constructed by 3 items 
and with a reliability coefficient of .631. The cautionary 
concluding statements about this scale should be 
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contextualized on one of the most recent studies conducted. 
In Marsh et al. (2011), Teaching Practice (named 
Instructional Practices) is measured on several sets of 
subscales. For example, Student-Directed Instruction is 
formed by 4 items and its reliability coefficient is .66, 
while Standards-Aligned Instruction is formed by 2 items 
and its coefficient of reliability is .54 (see Marsh et 
al., 2011, Table 8.2 SPBP Teacher Survey Scale Description: 
Instructional Practices, p. 235). Further, Collaboration 
(also named Collaboration in Marsh et al., 2011), is 
measured by 3 subscales. One of these subscales, 
Collaboration with Whole Staff is comprised of 2 items with 
a reliability coefficient of .49 (see Marsh et al., 2011, 
Table 8.4 SPBP Teacher Survey Scale Description: 
Collaboration, p. 237). 
Some of the limitations made about findings using the 
Collaboration scale in this study, must be relativized 
within the context of current rigorous research, such as 
Marsh et al. (2011). So when it comes to the number of 
items in each scale and their coefficient of reliability, 
the scales developed for this study then seem to be 
adequate scientific measurement tools that can be used to 
inform the public in general, and the learning community in 
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particular, about how teachers perceive these new methods 
of compensation are affecting teaching and teachers. 
Specific items within the scales showed factor’s 
complex structure, meaning the item showed loading from 
more than one factor. This may indicate that the item is 
measuring more than one latent variable, adding limitations 
to the interpretability of the findings from the processing 
of the multiple linear regressions in which the scales were 
entered as dependent variables. 
The solution for communalities for the 3-item 
Collaboration scale showed communalities equal to one. This 
may mean that there is a problem with the quantity of data 
or the numbers of factors extracted. This solution adds a 
limitation to the interpretability of the scale as a 
measure of the latent variable. However, the step-by-step 
deletion of items within Collaboration described in detail 
in Chapter 4 showed that there were no data quantity 
problems to run the solution, so the limitation added to 
the usefulness of the scale should be minimized. 
 
Discussion about Research Question 2 
The second Research Question addressed by the study 
was, “To what extent do each of a series of variables (the 
amount of money awarded to teachers by the program, years 
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of teaching experience, years of teaching at current 
campus, age, ethnicity, type of teaching certification, 
path for teacher certification, and school level/subject 
taught) relate to the perceived effects of alternative 
compensation on teaching practice, motivation, and 
collaboration, if at all?” 
 In addressing Research Question 2, the study posited 
three non-directional hypotheses: each hypothesis sought to 
find a significant relationship between the teachers’ 
perceptions on how the alternative compensation affected 
their (1) Teaching Practice, (2) Motivation, and (3) 
Collaboration, and a set of independent variables discuss 
in more detail next. 
Teaching Practice 
The first research non-directional hypothesis was: 
there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the teachers’ perceptions of the impact that the 
alternative method of compensation had on their teaching 
practice and the following predictors: Grade level/Subject 
taught, Ethnicity, Type of teaching certification held, 
Path followed to obtain teacher certification, Years of 
teaching experience, Years of teaching experience at the 
current campus, Age, Amount of bonus money received during 
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the current year, and Amount of bonus money received during 
the previous year. 
The Multiple Linear Regression Model for variables 
predicting Teaching Practice showed R = .38, R² = .15, 
adjusted R² = .03 and a Standard Error of the Estimate 
equal to 3.29. The ANOVA for the regression model showed 
F(23, 173) = 1.29,  p > .05. These results indicate that 
the relationship between the criterion variable and the 
predictors is not statistically significant. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected and, therefore, no statistically 
significant linear relationship of teachers’ perceptions of 
the impact that the alternative method of compensation had 
on their teaching practice and the predictor variables was 
found. 
These findings concur with Marsh et al. (2011). In 
their research, the authors observed no statistically 
significant differences between the group receiving 
alternative pay and the control group in terms of changes 
in teaching practice. Springer et al. (2009, 2010) also 
arrived at the same conclusion when evaluating the effects 
of TEEG and DATE monies on Teaching Practice in the state 
of Texas.  
Conversely, Kellor (2005) concluded that teachers made 
real changes in teaching practice by accommodating their 
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teaching to increase outcomes that will lead to receive the 
extra compensation. Raham (2000) somewhat concurs with 
Kellor noting the conclusions of studies conducted in North 
Carolina and Texas, highlighting, however, that much of the 
evidence was anecdotal. The results in the study did not 
agree with these authors’ findings. 
So even though positive effects of incentive programs 
on teaching practice are not being detected in most recent 
research studies, the implementation of alternative 
compensation has been intensely supported by States and the 
Federal Government around the nation. It opens a line of 
questioning not currently addressed by research, which is, 
what is the actual source for the impetus behind all the 
effort, dedication, and monetary support to implement these 
programs, if research does not find positive effects of 
them on schooling? One possible answer to this question, 
from the scientific investigation point of view, could be 
to move from alternative compensation programs evaluations 
to policy analysis and the reasons behind the application 
of certain education policies. 
Motivation 
The second research non-directional hypothesis was: 
there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the teachers’ perceptions of the impact that the 
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alternative method of compensation had on their motivation 
and the following predictors: Grade level/Subject taught, 
Ethnicity, Type of teaching certification held, Path 
followed to obtain teacher certification, Years of teaching 
experience, Years of teaching experience at the current 
campus, Age, Amount of bonus money received during the 
current year, and Amount of bonus money received during the 
previous year. 
The Multiple Linear Regression Model for variables 
predicting Motivation showed R = .42, R² = .18, adjusted       
R² = .07 and a Standard Error of the Estimate equal to 
3.75. The ANOVA for the regression model showed F(23, 171) 
= 1.58, p = .05. 
These results indicate that the relationship between 
the criterion variable and the predictors is statistically 
significant. The null hypothesis is rejected and, 
therefore, a statistically significant linear relationship 
of teachers’ perceptions of the impact that the alternative 
method of compensation had on their motivation and the 
predictor variables was found. 
The regression model indicates that Asian teachers 
perceive that the money received impacted their teaching 
practice more than White teachers, all other variables 
remaining constant. 
88 
 
 
 
These results suggest that Asian teachers feel on 
average that money from the incentive program motivates 
them more than White teachers. The recent literature does 
not address how money from performance pay programs impact 
teachers’ motivation differently based on their ethnicity. 
The study could be indicating that cultural differences do 
matter. The question whether or not Asians living in the 
United States are more inclined to be motivated by money 
than Caucasian Americans require further examination. It 
could also mean that Asian teachers are more likely to 
perform specific tasks making them more bias toward money, 
although not because of their ethnicity but because of the 
kind of position they held. Further investigation should be 
conducted to determine whether Asian ethnic teachers, for 
example, occupy more Math and Science teaching positions 
than Language Arts, Social Studies or any other subject. 
Once that relationship was established, further research 
should attempt to clarify if there is a statistically 
significant difference between different ethnicities 
holding those specific teaching positions. For example, do 
White Science teachers have the same perception as Asian 
Science teachers in regards of how money affects their 
profession? 
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The regression model also indicates that Age and the 
perception on how money affects motivation have a 
significant inverse relationship. The results indicate that 
for every year of increment in age, the perception of the 
impact of bonus money on motivation decreases. These 
findings suggest that teacher become less likely to be 
motivated by money as they become older. 
It may be that older teachers have their financial 
lives more settled, and the reasons why they entered and 
remained in education are not related to monetary 
incentives. On the other hand, young teachers coming out of 
college may have a plethora of reasons why to pursue more 
financial gains and any program that would allow them to 
get that, becomes a motivator. In addition, some 
generational differences could play a part. As Coggshall, 
Ott, Behrstock, and Lasagna (2009) reported, Gen Y teachers 
– those born between 1977 and 1995 - tend to believe their 
successes should be rewarded with money, and are more 
likely to support performance-based bonuses and programs 
than older teachers do. 
The regression model found there is an overall 
statistically significant association between the predictor 
variables and how teachers perceive money affected their 
motivation. But, as discussed, only two independent 
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variables showed a statistically significant degree of 
relationship with the dependable variable, one being 
negative, and the other one negligible. This concurs with 
recent investigations about the perceived effects of 
performance-based alternate compensation on motivation. 
Heneman (1998), for instance, reported that teachers were 
not motivated by the monetary bonus but rather for helping 
students learn and see them achieve their goals. These 
teachers reported being motivated by succeeding at doing 
their job. This is in line with Herzberg’s motivation-
hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1968 and 1987), which suggests 
that factors involved in producing motivation or 
satisfaction are intrinsic to the job at hand and belong to 
a different psychological continuum than those that lead to 
job dissatisfaction. Thus the opposite of job satisfaction 
is not dissatisfaction but no job satisfaction, and the 
opposite of dissatisfaction is not satisfaction but no job 
dissatisfaction. Motivator factors are a source of 
satisfaction, thus not demanding external incentives to 
produce movement (behavior produced as a function of fear 
of punishment or failure to get extrinsic rewards). Factors 
characterizing events on the job that lead to satisfaction 
are: achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, 
advancement, and growth. Note that work itself is a source 
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of satisfaction, therefore motivator. On the other hand, 
factors that can be a source of dissatisfaction are not 
motivators, but hygiene factors. These factors include 
organization policy and administration, supervision, 
relationship with supervisor, work conditions, pay, 
relation with peers and subordinates, personal life, 
status, and security. Notice that money is not a motivator 
but a hygiene factor. Therefore, as portrait in Figure 7, 
motivation and hygiene factors belong to two different 
psychological continuums. 
 
Satisfaction psychological continuum 
Less Satisfaction     More satisfaction 
 
MOTIVATOR FACTORS 
 
Dissatisfaction psychological continuum 
Less dissatisfaction   More dissatisfaction 
 
HYGIENE FACTORS 
 
Figure 7. Motivator and Hygiene factors depicted as 
belonging to two different psychological continuums 
according to Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
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The study showed that age is negatively associated 
with the perception of how money affected teachers’ 
motivation. With the exception of Asian teachers in 
comparison to White teachers, the study did not find 
significant positive relations between the financial 
incentive and the teachers’ perceptions on its impact on 
motivation. Not finding positive effects of money awards on 
motivation may be part of an emerging trend in results from 
educational research (Gallagher, 2004; Heneman III, 1998; 
Kellor, 2005; Marsh et al., 2011), in which the attempts to 
increase teachers’ motivation at work by rewarding them 
with extra compensation have not been successful. The model 
seems to be inappropriate to develop explanations and 
understandings of this phenomenon that may inform decision-
making about alternative compensation’s policy 
implementation aiming at motivating teachers. This would 
suggest the need to change the approach used in conducting 
research about how monetary rewards motivate teachers. It 
would imply to move from the Bandura’s Expectancy-Theory to 
Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory. Such a shift would 
move the theory from motivation as a function of the 
perceived probability that working hard will lead to 
certain desired outcomes, to motivation as a function of 
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growth that is attained from intrinsic rewards due to 
performing the job’s tasks. 
Collaboration 
The third research non-directional hypothesis was: 
there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the teachers’ perceptions of the impact that the 
alternative method of compensation had on their 
collaboration and the following predictors: Grade 
level/Subject taught, Ethnicity, Type of teaching 
certification held, Path followed to obtain teacher 
certification, Years of teaching experience, Years of 
teaching experience at the current campus, Age, Amount of 
bonus money received during the current year, and Amount of 
bonus money received during the previous year. 
The Multiple Linear Regression Model for variables 
predicting Collaboration showed R = .37, R² = .14, adjusted 
R² = .02 and a Standard Error of the Estimate equal to 
2.36. The Analysis of Variance statistics for the 
regression model showed F(23, 173) = 1.18, p > .05. 
These results indicate that the relationship between 
the criterion variable and the predictors is not 
statistically significant. The null hypothesis is not 
rejected and, therefore, no statistically significant 
linear relationship of teachers’ perceptions of the impact 
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that the alternative method of compensation had on their 
collaboration and the predictor variables was found. 
Many authors (Eberts, R., Hollenbeck, K., & Stone, J., 
2002; Donlevy, 2008; Grinesky, 2005a, 2005b; Kellor, 2005; 
Goldhaber et al., 2008) feared a negative impact of 
monetary rewards in collaboration. The present study did 
not detect that relationship. The model did not confirm 
specific negative effects suggested by some authors in 
regards to a perception of a reduction of sense of 
community among teachers (Kellor, 2005), nor the 
demoralizing effects suggested by Goldhaber at al. (2008).  
Because the results did not indicate a negative significant 
relationship between the criterion and dependent variable, 
the study did not show that incentive pay reduced the 
interest for teachers to cooperate, as some critics of 
performance-based incentives claimed. Therefore, research 
does not seem to suggest that performance-based 
compensation negatively affect collaboration. 
The study did not find any positive relationship 
between the money awards and the teachers’ perceptions of a 
positive impact on collaboration. The study concurs with 
Marsh et al. (2011) in regards to the lack of effects on 
collaboration by the incentive program. While 40% of 
teachers working in schools under the incentive program in 
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the New York study reported collaboration had changed for 
better, more teachers from the control group reported such 
a positive change, even though the difference was not 
statistically significant (Marsh et al., 2011). 
This finding contradicts the theory of action defined 
by Marsh et al. (2011), which portraits the enhancement of 
collaboration as one of the tenets of implementing 
alternative compensation. Consequently, research does not 
seem to suggest either that performance-based compensation 
positively affect collaboration. 
As suggested by Seashore, Febey, and Schroeder (2005), 
scientific knowledge regarding how money from incentive 
programs affects the exercise of teaching, may help discern 
whether stakeholders would engage in significant change, 
change, or resistance when confronted to the implementation 
of alternative compensation policy. This brings up a strong 
case in favor of continuing research about how performance 
based alternative compensation affects Teaching Practice, 
Motivation, and Collaboration as seeing by practitioners. 
By stepping up investigation in this area, more light 
should be shed to enlighten the inconclusiveness 
surrounding current state of the art in this matter. 
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APPENDIX A – DISTRICT APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
  
 
from Anselm, Yuping <Yuping.Anselm@fortbend.k12.tx.us> 
to Juan Pablo Barrio <juan.pablo.barrio@gmail.com> 
cc "Moore, Janice (Admin)" <janice.moore@fortbend.k12.tx.us> 
date Wed, Mar 23, 2011 at 9:07 AM 
subject Re: Your Research Application 
mailed-by fortbend.k12.tx.us 
 
 
 
 
Dear Mr. Barrio, 
  
Your research application titled “Teachers’ Perceptions 
about How an Alternative Method of Compensation Affected 
Teaching Practice” (Application No. 2011-6) has been 
approved by has been approved by Fort Bend ISD.  You have 
the district approval to conduct your research with all 
DATE campuses from March 28, 2011 to April 15, 
2011.   Alternatively, since TAKS tests take place in 
April, we recommend that you collect your survey responses 
in May, 2011.  Please note that our staff is under no 
obligation to participate in the study despite the district 
approval.  
This email will serve as an approval letter.  If you need an official letter with the 
Fort Bend ISD letterhead, please let us know and we can provide one as well.  
 When you complete your research, please submit the Data Collection 
Completion Notification Form (available on FBISD research website) and share 
with us your findings in a summary.  
We wish you good luck in your research efforts.  If you have any further question, 
please let us know. 
   
Yuping Anselm, Ph.D. 
Coordinator of Research and Program Evaluation 
Department of Accountability and Program Evaluation 
Division of Academic and Instructional Services 
Fort Bend ISD 
Tel: 281-634-1296 
Fax: 281-634-1532 
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APPENDIX B - PILOTED INSTRUMENT’S COLLABORATION ITEMS 
MODIFIED FOR THE STUDY 
 
 
Item 
key 
Piloted instrument’s  
items description 
Instrument’s modified 
items administered for 
the study 
C1 
 
Collaboration on my 
campus towards helping 
students achieve 
mastery of their grade 
level content 
skyrocketed due to the 
Performance Pay Plan. 
Collaboration on my 
campus towards helping 
children achieve 
student expectations 
improved due to the 
Performance Pay Plan. 
C4 Payment programs like 
Performance Pay Plan go 
against quality 
teaching because they 
incorporate 
individualistic 
business-like logic 
into the classroom. 
Payment programs like 
Performance Pay Plan 
go against quality 
teaching because they 
bring individualistic 
attitudes into the 
classroom. 
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APPENDIX C – LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Teachers’ perceptions about how an 
alternative method of compensation affected teaching 
practice. 
 
Dear Fort Bend educator, 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research project 
conducted by Mr. Juan Barrio from the College of Education, 
Curriculum and Instruction Department, at the University of 
Houston.  This project is part of my doctoral dissertation, 
which is conducted under the supervision of Dr. Melissa 
Pierson, chair of the Dissertation Defense Committee.  
 
The purpose of this study is to research teachers’ 
perceptions about how an alternative method of 
compensation, such as the bonuses awarded by the D.A.T.E. 
grant, has affected their teaching practice. The number of 
expected participants is 400 teachers. You will be asked to 
answer a brief 15-items survey which could take 
approximately 10 to 15 minutes. You will have to explicitly 
grant your consent to participate in the study by flagging 
a consent field before answering the survey on-line. 
 
Your participation in this project is anonymous. No data 
will be collected that can identify you. All research 
projects that are carried out by investigators at the 
University of Houston are governed by requirements of the 
University and the Federal Government. This project has 
been reviewed by the University of Houston Committee for 
the Protection of Human Subjects (713-743-9204). All 
surveys’ answers will be available only to the research 
team. 
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The results of this study may be published in professional 
and/or scientific journals.  It may also be used for 
educational purposes or for professional presentations.  
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw at 
any time. Your decision to participate will have no effect 
on your employment standing. There is no foreseeable harm 
to you by participating in the study. Conversely, you will 
be contributing to increasing the understanding about how 
alternative methods of compensating teachers affect their 
teaching practice. This could result in benefits to 
research and policy implementation in the future. 
 
If you have any questions, I encourage you to contact me at 
832-226-9691 or via email at juan.pablo.barrio@gmail.com.  
You may also contact Dr. Pierson, faculty sponsor, at 713-
743-4961. 
 
You will be receiving shortly an email with a link to the 
survey. Please click on the link so you can answer the 
items on line. Thank you for your participation. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Juan Pablo Barrio, Principal investigator 
 
Any questions regarding your rights as a research subject 
may be addressed to the University of Houston Committee for 
the Protection of Human Subjects (713-743-9204). 
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APPENDIX D – RECRUITMENT SCRIPT 
 
 
Dear Fort Bend educator, 
 
You are invited to participate in a study called “Teachers’ 
perceptions about how an alternative method of compensation 
affected teaching practice”. This study has been reviewed 
by the University of Houston Committee for the Protection 
of Human Subjects (713) 743-9204. To participate you must 
be a teacher in a DATE campus in the Fort Bend ISD and 
grant your consent before you answer a survey. You will be 
asked to mark if you Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither 
agree nor disagree, Agree, or Strongly agree with 
statements about how the DATE bonuses affected your 
teaching practice. The content of an informed consent 
document reviewed by the University of Houston is on the 
first page of the survey. Please contact me if you are 
interested in receiving a separate informed consent 
document. If you agree to participate in the study please 
click here to answer the on-line survey. If you have any 
questions about this study you can contact me or Dr. 
Melissa Pierson, faculty sponsor. Our contact information 
is listed below. 
 
Juan Pablo Barrio 
Principal Investigator 
832-226-9691 
Juan.pablo.barrio@gmail.com 
 
Dr. Melissa Pierson 
Faculty sponsor 
713-743-4979 
mpierson@uh.edu 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E – RESEARCH PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS AND LETTER OF 
CONSENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
SUBJECT RIGHTS 
 
1. I understand that informed consent is required of all 
persons participating in this project. 
 
2. All procedures have been explained to me and all my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
3. Any risks and/or discomforts have been explained to me. 
4. Any benefits have been explained to me. 
 
5. I understand that, if I have any questions, I may contact 
Juan Pablo Barrio at 832-226-9691.  I may also contact 
Dr. Melissa Pierson, faculty sponsor, at 713-743-4961. 
 
6. I have been told that I may refuse to participate or to 
stop my participation in this project at any time before 
or during the project.  I may also refuse to answer any 
question. 
 
7. ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING MY RIGHTS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT 
MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON COMMITTEE 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (713-743-9204).  ALL 
RESEARCH PROJECTS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT BY INVESTIGATORS 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON ARE GOVERNED BY REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
8. All information that is obtained in connection with this 
project and that can be identified with me will remain 
confidential as far as possible within legal limits.  
Information gained from this study that can be identified 
with me may be released to no one other than the 
principal investigator and Dr. Melissa Pierson, faculty 
advisor.  The results may be published in scientific 
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journals, professional publications, or educational 
presentations without identifying me by name. 
 
 
I HAVE READ (OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME) THE CONTENTS OF THIS 
CONSENT FORM AND HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO ASK QUESTIONS.  I 
HAVE RECEIVED ANSWERS TO MY QUESTIONS.  I GIVE MY CONSENT 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.  I HAVE RECEIVED (OR WILL 
RECEIVE) A COPY OF THIS FORM FOR MY RECORDS AND FUTURE 
REFERENCE. 
 
 
Study Subject (print name):______________________________________ 
 
Signature of Study Subject:______________________________________ 
 
Date:____________________________________________________________ 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
I HAVE READ THIS FORM TO THE SUBJECT AND/OR THE SUBJECT HAS 
READ THIS FORM.  AN EXPLANATION OF THE RESEARCH WAS GIVEN 
AND QUESTIONS FROM THE SUBJECT WERE SOLICITED AND ANSWERED 
TO THE SUBJECT’S SATISFACTION.  IN MY JUDGMENT, THE SUBJECT 
HAS DEMONSTRATED COMPREHENSION OF THE INFORMATION. 
 
 
Principal Investigator (print name and title):___________________ 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator:_____________________________ 
 
Date: _____________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX F - INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please mark each statement if you Strongly disagree, Disagree, 
Neither agree nor disagree, Agree, or Strongly agree. Place a 
clear X inside the box that corresponds to your answer. 
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 d
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 m
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1 The existence of the Performance Pay 
Plan bonus helps me concentrate on the 
best teaching strategies for my 
students.              
2 The Performance Pay Plan has no 
influence on the effort I put in 
fulfilling my teaching responsibilities. 
             
3 Collaboration on my campus towards 
helping children achieve student 
expectations improved due to the 
Performance Pay Plan.               
4 Teachers who receive bigger bonuses also 
receive a preferential treatment from 
administrators. 
             
5 I consider how much money I may receive 
from Performance Pay Plan to quantify 
the effort I put in my work as a 
teacher.              
6 Due to the Performance Pay Plan teachers 
on my campus stopped working 
collaboratively.              
7 I think at all times how Performance Pay 
Plan bonuses are calculated when 
planning my lessons.              
8 Performance Pay Plan money makes me a 
better teacher.              
9 Performance Pay Plan has not changed my 
motivation to facilitate students in 
becoming more effective learners. 
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10 Since the school district implemented 
Performance Pay Plan our working place 
has shifted towards a less 
individualistic goal-oriented 
environment.              
11 The more money I receive from the 
Performance Pay Plan the more effort I 
put into my teaching responsibilities.  
             
12 The Performance Pay Plan increased my 
interest in helping students better 
demonstrate how well they know required 
content.              
13 The Performance Pay Plan increased my 
enthusiasm in guiding students to become 
better learners.              
14 Payment programs like Performance Pay 
Plan go against quality teaching because 
they bring individualistic attitudes 
into the classroom. 
             
15 The Performance Pay Plan has not changed 
my teaching practice in any significant 
way.              
 
 
Grade 
currently 
taught 
(Mark all that 
apply). 
 
□ PK-2  
□ Grades 3-5 
□ Team teaching 
□ Grades 6-8 
□ Grades 9-12 
□ Ancillary, 
Resource, other. 
Teacher 
Certification 
(Mark all that apply). 
□ Element. Certified 
Regular 
□ Element. Bilingual 
□  Probationary 
Certification 
□  Secondary Core 
Content 
□  Certified ESL 
□  Other 
 
 
Certified through 
(Mark all that apply). 
□ Undergraduate 
baccalaureate in 
education 
□ Deficiency Plan 
□ Certified through ACP 
□ Other, please specify:  
 
     _________________ 
 
Years of Teaching 
Experience 
(Write a number, for example if you  
have taught six years, write 06.  
Count full years including current  
school year as a full year). 
 
   Years of Teaching 
              Experience 
 
   Years of Teaching 
         Experience on 
       current campus 
 
                         Age 
 
Performance Pay Plan Bonus  
 
 I received money from Performance Pay Plan: 
 Last disbursement  □ NO □ YES, amount received: ________________       
 Year before last disbursement  □ NO □ YES, amount received: ________________ 
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Ethnicity: I consider myself to be (Mark all that apply) 
 
□ Asian or Pacific Islander    □ Black or African-American    □ Hispanic or Latino     
 
□ White or Caucasian 
 
□ Other:         ___________________________     
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APPENDIX G – KEY FOR INSTRUMENT’S ITEMS  
  
 
Key 
 
Item 
 
TP1 
 
The existence of the Performance Pay Plan bonus helps me 
concentrate on the best teaching strategies for my 
students. 
M1 The Performance Pay Plan has no influence on the effort I 
put in fulfilling my teaching responsibilities. 
C5 Collaboration on my campus towards helping children 
achieve student expectations improved due to the 
Performance Pay Plan.  
C1 Teachers who receive bigger bonuses also receive a 
preferential treatment from administrators. 
M2 I consider how much money I may receive from Performance 
Pay Plan to quantify the effort I put in my work as a 
teacher. 
C2 Due to the Performance Pay Plan teachers on my campus 
stopped working collaboratively. 
TP2 I think at all times how Performance Pay Plan bonuses are 
calculated when planning my lessons. 
TP3 Performance Pay Plan money makes me a better teacher. 
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M3 Performance Pay Plan has not changed my motivation to 
facilitate students in becoming more effective learners. 
C3 Since the school district implemented Performance Pay Plan 
our working place has shifted towards a less 
individualistic goal-oriented environment. 
TP4 The more money I receive from the Performance Pay Plan the 
more effort I put into my teaching responsibilities.  
M4 The Performance Pay Plan increased my interest in helping 
students better demonstrate how well they know required 
content. 
M5 The Performance Pay Plan increased my enthusiasm in 
guiding students to become better learners. 
C4 Payment programs like Performance Pay Plan go against 
quality teaching because they bring individualistic 
attitudes into the classroom. 
TP5 The Performance Pay Plan has not changed my teaching 
practice in any significant way. 
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APPENDIX H – DESCRIPTION OF REGRESSION MODELS’ VARIABLES 
INPUT 
 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Teach 3rd to 5
th
 Grade 
 
Teacher who teaches 3
rd
, 4
th
, or 5
th
 grade 
Self-Contained or Team Teaching 
Teach 6-8 Across 
Subjects 
Teacher who teaches more than one subject 
in 6
th
, 7
th
, or 8
th
 grade 
Teach 6-8 Language Arts Teacher who teaches Language Arts, 
Reading, and Writing in 6
th
, 7
th
, or 8
th
 
grade 
Teach 6-8 Mathematics Teacher who teaches Mathematics in 6
th
, 
7
th
, or 8
th
 grade 
Teach 6-8 Science Teacher who teaches Science in 6
th
, 7
th
, 
or 8
th
 grade 
Teach 6-8 Social 
Studies 
Teacher who teaches Social Studies in 6
th
, 
7
th
, or 8
th
 grade 
Teach Other Teacher who teaches any subject in any 
grade level other than the ones mentioned 
above. For example: Ancillary or Special 
Education. Some teachers reported “Other: 
Music”, or “Other: Art”, etc.  
Ethnicity Asian Teacher who reported being of Asian or 
Pacific Islander Ethnicity 
Ethnicity African-Am Teacher who reported being of African-
American or Black Ethnicity 
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Ethnicity Latino Teacher who reported being of Hispanic or 
Latino Ethnicity 
Ethnicity Other Teacher who reported being of Other 
Ethnicity or multiracial 
Cert Bilingual Teacher who holds a Bilingual Teaching 
Certificate 
Cert Second Core 
Subject 
Teacher who holds a Mathematics, Language 
Arts, Social Studies, or Science 
Secondary Teaching Certificate 
Cert Other Teacher who holds a Teaching Certificate 
other than described above. For example: 
Special Education, Arts, or Music 
Cert Multiple 
Certification 
Teacher who holds more than one Teaching 
Certificate 
Through ACP Teacher who obtain a Teaching Certificate 
through an Alternative Certification 
Program 
Through Deficiency Plan Teacher who obtain a Teaching Certificate 
through a Deficiency Plan 
Through Other Teacher who obtain a Teaching Certificate 
through other path other than ACP, 
Deficiency Plan, or Baccalaureate degree 
in Education 
Teaching Experience Years of teaching experience 
Tech. Exp. At Campus Years of teaching experience at the 
current campus 
Age Age of teacher 
Received Bonus Current 
Year 
Amount of money received from the 
Performance Pay Plan during the current 
school year 
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Received Bonus Previous 
Year 
Amount of money received from the 
Performance Pay Plan during the previous 
school year 
 
